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Universities have served as the birthplace of innovation in a wide range
of disciplines. In the past, entire industries have blossomed from
technology initially created at universities. Consequently, there is a
consistent desire to transfer innovation from universities to the private
sector. There is also an additional desire to transfer technology from
universities more extensively and more efficiently for the broader benefit of
society. Not surprisingly, transferring university-originating innovations to
the private sector has been an active arena for legislative reform such as the
Bayh-Dole Act and for scholarly criticisms and analysis.
This essay analyzes the information submitted in annual reports from
1996-2003 by ninety-four universities to the Association of University
Technology Managers (AUTM). My analysis shows that university
technology transfer activities continue to be predominantly patent-centric
and revenue-driven with a single-minded focus on generating licensing
income and obtaining reimbursement for legal expenses. University
technology transfer activities do not extend far beyond this narrow focus;
commercialization activities (e.g., number of start-up companies) and
strategies to transfer innovation, more broadly, do not figure prominently.
In fact, universities do not engage in a broad range of activities that might
result successfully in a transfer of university-originating innovation to
different sectors in society.
In this work, I urge that universities must go beyond generating revenue,
actively pursue entrepreneurial and commercialization activities, and
readily embrace alternative technology transfer methods, such as open
collaborations, free participant use agreements, and royalty-free licensing.
Such steps likely would result in the adoption and dissemination throughout
society of university innovations. In order to embrace this comprehensive
approach to transferring innovation, university technology transfer offices
(TTOs) need to broaden substantively their business models and restructure
themselves within the university hierarchies so that the incentives they (the
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would also like to thank Jesse Abzug, Chris Cotropia, Mark Lemley, Lesley Millar, Arti Rai,
and Bhaven Sampat for their comments and suggestions.
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TTO and its employees) face are compatible with a broader vision of
technology transfer.
This essay is organized as follows. Part I discusses university patenting
activities prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. Part II
examines the purpose and the effect of the Bayh-Dole legislation. In Part
III, this essay analyzes the role, structure, and business model of university
TTOs. In addition, Part III includes an empirical analysis of annual reports
regarding technology transfer activities submitted by ninety-four academic
institutions to the AUTM from 1996 to 2003, as well as insights and
criticisms that flow from the empirical analysis concerning the technology
transfer practices employed by universities. Finally, Part IV studies other
criticisms of university patenting activities, and Parts V and VI focus on
measures and incentives that may be employed to restructure, expand, and
improve university-based technology transfer.
I. UNIVERSITY PATENTING BEFORE 1980
For a long time, industry representatives have turned to the laboratories
of universities as sources for scientific innovations.' After World War II,
the federal government became more involved with the funding of
university research when Vannevar Bush made a report at President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's request emphasizing the potential value of
government funding of basic research at universities. 2 Bush's report was in
part a response to the success of the Manhattan Project, which had shown
the government how vital university research could be to national defense. 3
This new emphasis led to an increase in government funding for basic
research, but the open science norms of academia that emphasized wide
dissemination of research results often deterred researchers from seeking
protection for their inventions. 4 These open science norms, along with the
somewhat complicated procedure of obtaining title to govermment-funded
inventions, likely resulted in a very low emphasis on patenting university
research.
The year 1980 represented a turning point in the patent field, in part due
to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.5  Some scholars (somewhat
incorrectly) assert that all government-funded inventions belonged to the
1. See infra Part I.A-B.
2. Howard W. Bremer, University Technology Transfer: Evolution and Revolution, in
COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 50TH ANNIVERSARY: 1948-1998, at 13, 13-14
(1998), available at http://www.cogr.edu/docs/Anniversary.pdf.
3. COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A GUIDE TO THE
LAW AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 1 (1999) [hereinafter COGR GUIDE], available at
http://www.cogr.edu/docs/BayhDole.pdf. Vannevar Bush also emphasized the importance
of university research to innovation in industry. Id.
4. Charles R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic
Research and Development: Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical Evidence to Date 17-
18 (Aug. 13, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/
institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/mcmanis.doc.
5. See infra Part II for a discussion of the Bayh-Dole Act.
2170
.[Vol. 77
TRANSFERRING INNO VA TION
government prior to the passage of the Act and place little emphasis on
university inventions for which the university controlled the patent. 6
Admittedly, most universities did not become very involved in technology
transfer prior to the passage of the Act, in part due to the complexity of
obtaining patent rights in government-funded inventions. 7 However, it
would be incorrect to assert that universities simply were not patenting
discoveries, since several quite significant exceptions indicate extensive
university involvement in the commercialization of inventions. 8 Three of
the most significant examples of patenting efforts associated with
universities prior to 1980 are the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
(WARF), the Research Corporation, and the Cohen-Boyer Patents
concerning recombinant DNA.9 As noted below, the formation of WARF
and the Research Corporation represented attempts to promote the
commercialization of important discoveries by university inventors in the
early twentieth century. Significantly, both of these pre-Bayh-Dole
technology-transfer entities were formed with the purpose of using patents
to ensure consistent quality of subsequent developments instead of just
obtaining financial rewards for the inventors.
6. See, e.g., Tanuja V. Garde, Supporting Innovation in Targeted Treatments: Licenses
of Right to NIH-Funded Research Tools, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 249, 254-55
(2005) (asserting that prior to passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, all patents on government-
funded research belonged to the government). This may have been the default rule, but it
does not take into account actions that universities could take to retain patent rights in
government-funded research findings. For example, consider the actions associated with the
Cohen-Boyer patents. See infra Part I.C.
7. See Rebecca Henderson, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Universities as a
Source of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965-
1988, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 119, 121 (1998) (stating that before 1980, universities had to
seek a title rights waiver from the funding agency in order to profit from a patent on
federally funded research findings); Ted Sabety, Nanotechnology Innovation and the Patent
Thicket: Which IP Policies Promote Growth?, 15 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 477, 485-86
(2005); Julia Porter Liebeskind, Risky Business: Universities and Intellectual Property,
ACADEME ONLINE, Sept.-Oct. 2001, available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/
academe/2001/SO/Feat/Lieb.htm; Robert E. Litan et al., Commercializing University
Innovations: A Better Way 6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper JEL No.
018, M13, 033, 034, 038, 2007), available at http://www.kauffman.org/pdf/NBER_0407.pdf
(quoting Senator Robert Dole's reference to the pre-1980 process of allowing a university to
retain patent rights as being a "hideous example of over management by the bureaucracy").
8. See DAVID C. MOWERY, RICHARD R. NELSON, BHAVEN N. SAMPAT & ARVIDS A.
ZIEDONIS, IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 53
(2004). The birth of technology transfer may be traced to the 1879 discovery and subsequent
patenting of saccharine by a scientist at Johns Hopkins University. William R. Brody,
President, Johns Hopkins Univ., Remarks Inaugurating the Biomedical Engineering Lecture
Series: From Minds to Minefields: Negotiating the Demilitarized Zone Between Industry
and Academia (Apr. 6, 1999), available at http://web.jhu.edu/president/speeches/1999/
biomlec.html.
9. See infra Part IA-C. The Cohen-Boyer patents were applied for in 1974, but the
first patent was not granted until 1980, shortly before the effective date of the Bayh-Dole
Act. Kenneth Sutherlin Ducker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-
Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 494 (1997).
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A. The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
WARF was formed in 1925 to aid in the commercialization of a
discovery by the University of Wisconsin-Madison concerning the
fortification of foods with vitamin D using ultraviolet radiation.' 0 The
inventor, Harry Steenbock, knew the invention had the potential to
eliminate rickets, but felt that this goal likely would not be met without
proper management of the invention.1 ' Steenbock chose to seek patent
protection because he believed that patent protection would lead to better
quality control over subsequent developments and ensure that this method
of fortification would be used in the best interest of public health. 12
Because the university did not want to take title to Steenbock's patent,
Steenbock contacted a number of Wisconsin alumni and worked with them
to create the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. 13
During the 1960s, WARF negotiated with the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (DHEW), which was then the agency with authority
over the National Institutes of Health (NIH), 14 to ensure that WARF would
receive title to inventions developed with DHEW funds. 15  WARF
continued to commercialize faculty inventions prior to and following the
Bayh-Dole Act and was a very active supporter of the Act as it was being
developed in Congress. 16 WARF still constitutes an active and successful
technology transfer association, with its revenues accounting for five
percent of the total research budget at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison. 17  Currently, WARF holds the patents on several lines of
10. Id. at 456.
11. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, Steenbock and WARF's Founding,
http://www.warf.org/about/index.jsp?cid=26&scid=33 (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
12. Id.
13. Bhaven N. Sampat & Richard R. Nelson, The Emergence and Standardization of
University Technology Transfer Offices: A Case Study of Institutional Change 8-9 (Sept.
16-18, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE99/Papers/
nelson.pdf.
14. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 43.
15. Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Dir., Wis. Alumni Research Found., The
Kastenmeier Lecture at the University of Wisconsin Law School: Bayh-Dole: Wisconsin
Roots and Inspired Public Policy (Nov. 3, 2006), in 2007 Wis. L. REV. 1149, 1157
(explaining that the efforts eventually resulted in negotiation of an Institutional Patent
Agreement (IPA) with the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW)).
Carl Gulbrandsen, however, implies that the Bayh-Dole Act gives more credibility to the
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation's (WARF) claims of title to federally funded
inventions. He goes so far as to suggest that the inventions currently owned by WART
would instead be owned by federal agencies in the absence of Bayh-Dole, even though the
IPAs that WARF negotiated with federal agencies seem to have fulfilled that role on their
own. Id. at 1158-59.
16. Ducker, supra note 9, at 456 (providing a table of information of significant
biomedical inventions commercialized by WARF); Press Release, Wis. Alumni Research
Found., WARF Receives National Medal of Technology (Mar. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.warf.org/news/news.jsp?newsid=178.
17. Dueker, supra note 9, at 457 (reporting WARF's revenues as of 1997).
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embryonic stem cells. 18 These patents became a very valuable asset after
the federal government prohibited development of new cell lines. 
19
B. The Research Corporation
The Research Corporation, which was active in managing university
patent portfolios in the decades before Bayh-Dole, was founded by
Frederick Cottrell around 1912, initially to commercialize Cottrell's
invention of an electrostatic precipitator.2 0 While not interested in revenue,
Cottrell believed that his invention would not be commercialized by firms
unless it was protected by a patent.2 1 This focus on technology transfer
rather than profit is a view that was shared by WARF and reinforces the
idea that university technology transfer is based on achieving effective
commercialization of university inventions.
The Research Corporation eventually branched out and supplied
patenting services to many universities, including the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT).2 2 Unfortunately, the Research Corporation
occasionally failed to manage its clients' patents effectively, leading in one
case to a loss of the Research Corporation's contract with MIT. 23 Part of
this failure has been attributed to the Research Corporation's tendency to
manage all patents in the manner that it managed patents in the life science
areas.2 4  Another possible reason for the decline of the usage of the
Research Corporation by universities is that it began to educate its clients in
the early 1970s about how to apply for their own patents. Thus, many
universities started to handle the patent application process themselves.
2 5
For example, Stanford University was a client of the Research Corporation
until 1969, when Neils Reimers joined Stanford's faculty and formed the
Office of Technology Licensing (OTL). 26
C. The Cohen-Boyer Patents
In the early 1970s, two scientists working in laboratories at the
University of California and Stanford University developed a method of
18. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, Technologies: Stem Cells,
http://www.warf.org/technologies.jsp?techfield=Stem+Cells (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
19. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 617 (2008). On March 9, 2009, President Barack Obama signed an
executive order that lifted the ban on federal funding for embryonic stem cell research. See
Scott Wilson, Obama Reverses Bush Policy on Stem Cell Research: The Ban on Federal
Funding Is Lifted, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2009, at A10.
20. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 59; Sampat & Nelson, supra note 13, at 11.
21. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 59.
22. Id. at 63.
23. Id. at 72.
24. Id. at 83.
25. Sampat & Nelson, supra note 13, at 19.
26. Interview by Sally Smith Hughes, Reg'l Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library,
Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, with Niels Reimers, Dir., Office of Tech. Licensing, Stanford Univ.,
in Berkeley, Cal. (May 8, 1997), available at http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docld=kt4b69
n6sc&brand=calisphere&doc.view-entiretext.
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splicing genes, a discovery credited as the basis for much of the modem
biotechnology industry.27 Neils Reimers of the Stanford OTL persuaded
the scientists to apply for a patent in 1974, and the scientists filed the
application just one week before the deadline (after that deadline, the patent
application would have been rejected because of prior publication). 28 The
OTL also had to negotiate an institutional patent agreement with the NIH,
which had funded most of the research. 29 The first of the patents was
granted in 1980, shortly before the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act. 30 The
patents, known collectively as the Cohen-Boyer patents, were licensed
broadly and nonexclusively, greatly aiding in the accessibility of this new
technology as genetic research developed along with modem
biotechnology. 3 1  Stanford specifically elected not to charge a higher
royalty, in spite of urging by at least one alumnus. 32 In 1989, Stanford even
created special provisions lowering the licensing fees and royalty rates that
small firms would have to pay to license the Cohen-Boyer patents. 33 The
Cohen-Boyer patents expired in 1997, but not before bringing in a
substantial amount of revenue and resulting in many developments in
biotechnology for the better part of the previous two decades. 34 The
Cohen-Boyer patents serve as a true success story of university patenting,
and the patents' success would not have been possible if universities could
not patent government-funded inventions prior to the passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act.
II. THE BAYH-DOLE ACT
From a patent standpoint, the Bayh-Dole Act was a very significant piece
of legislation during the 1980s, because it led to an increase in nonprofit
organizations' involvement in the patent system. The law made it easier for
nonprofit recipients of government funds (such as universities) to seek
patent protection for the resulting invention while reserving a nonexclusive,
27. Dueker, supra note 9, at 491.
28. Id. at 494; Interview with Niels Reimers, supra note 26. According to Niels
Reimers's own account, Reimers persuaded Stanley Cohen (who specifically did not want to
patent the discovery) to file a patent application, explaining that filing an application would
ensure that Cohen's discovery would be commercialized most effectively and that the license
process also could include requirements that the licensee follow safety guidelines. Id.
29. Id.
30. Dueker, supra note 9, at 495.
31. Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 611
(2005).
32. Maryann P. Feldman, Alessandra Colaianni & Connie Kang Liu, Lessons from the
Commercialization of the Cohen-Boyer Patents: The Stanford University Licensing
Program, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL
INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1797, 1800 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds.,
2007), available at http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/resources-and-tools/Publications/
links/ipHandbook%20Volume%202.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, Universities and the Market for Intellectual
Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253, 264 (1998) (noting that
the patents brought in $66.3 million in licensing revenue between 1980 and August of 1996).
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royalty-free license for the government and those acting on behalf of the
government. In addition, the Act reserved march-in rights to allow the
government to step in if it was found that the invention was not being
exploited effectively. 35
The Bayh-Dole Act was only one of several sweeping changes in patent
law in the early 1980s. Other changes included the U.S. Supreme Court's
1980 case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,36 where the Court held that genetically
engineered microorganisms were patentable subject matter, and the
establishment in 1982 of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
as the appeals court for patent claims. 37
Prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, the government agencies
responsible for funding research did not have a uniform policy concerning
the fate of the potential intellectual property rights in the fruits of
government-funded research. 38 The Bayh-Dole Act established such a
uniform policy, providing that patents for the results of government-funded
research may be held by the research entity, and that the entity may issue
exclusive licenses to promote the commercialization of the results. 39 In part
because of the variety of other changes to the patent system around the
same time, some scholars have questioned how significant the Act truly
35. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006).
36. 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980). Many scholars credit Diamond v. Chakrabarty with the
growth of patenting in the biotechnology industry. See, e.g., Ducker, supra note 9, at 494;
Garde, supra note 6, at 253; Peter Mikhail, Hopkins v. CellPro: An Illustration that
Patenting and Exclusive Licensing of Fundamental Science Is Not Always in the Public
Interest, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 375, 376 (2000).
37. Many scholars note that the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit was a very important turning point in patent law for two reasons: first, the Federal
Circuit was perceived as more likely to uphold a patent than other courts; second, the Federal
Circuit provided a level of consistency and reliability in patent law that did not exist before,
since patent decisions at the appellate level were made by different courts across the country.
John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products
and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 125-26 (2001); see also Jonathan
M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imperfect Patent Protection and the Network
Model of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 987, 997 (2000). See generally Dueker, supra
note 9, at 465; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289, 290.
38. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ADMINISTRATION OF THE
BAYH-DOLE ACT BY RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES: REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 3
(1998) [hereinafter GAO, TECH TRANSFER], available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/
ericdocs2sql/content-storage_01/0000019bl80/15/9a/9c.pdf. DHEW, for example, had a
policy of negotiating IPAs with universities, while the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
allowed universities to retain title if the universities followed "approved" patent policies.
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 45.
39. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 113-26; see also Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share
Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 398-99 (2006) (noting the two alternatives that funding
agencies might have adopted before Bayh-Dole: a license policy where title resides with the
inventor and the government keeps a license to use the technology; or a title policy where the
government retains full title and thus owns all of the resulting patents).
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was, but all scholars tend to agree that the Act had at least some effect on
the geography of the patent system. 40
A. Purpose
Commentators disagree about the specific purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act.
The data presented in support of the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act included
information that the government funding agencies owned 28,000 patents,
but that fewer than five percent of those patents were licensed to industry.41
The Bayh-Dole Act was passed in 1980 with the purpose of promoting the
transfer of technology developed as a result of government funding.42
Some scholars articulate the purpose more broadly, asserting that the Bayh-
Dole Act was passed to allow the public to receive more benefits from
university research through the commercialization of the inventions. 43 A
persuasive minority, however, urges that the simple purpose behind the
Bayh-Dole Act was standardization of policies.44 Some scholars within that
40. See, e.g., MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 1; Ducker, supra note 9, at 465; F. Scott
Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science-A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 691, 695 (2001) (noting that,
before 1980, it was much harder to obtain and defend a patent, which could explain why
more universities did not seek patents on inventions); Lemley, supra note 31, at 617;
Mikhail, supra note 36, at 375.
41. COGR GUIDE, supra note 3, at 2. Contra McManis & Noh, supra note 4, at 12
(noting that the data used in support of the Act was flawed); infra note 45.
42. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006); WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE BAYH-
DOLE ACT: SELECTED ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
TECHNOLOGY 4-5 (2006), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Jan/
RL32076.pdf, Barnett, supra note 37, at 995; Garde, supra note 6, at 255; Lemley, supra
note 31, at 617; Innovation's Golden Goose, ECONOMIST TECH. Q., Dec. 14, 2002, at 3, 3
(referring to the Bayh-Dole Act as "[p]ossibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be
enacted in America over the past half-century" and noting that the Act caused universities to
become "hotbeds of innovation" overnight). But see MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 91
(acknowledging the primary argument that few of the government-owned patents were
licensed, but pointing out that such justification was based on incomplete information, since
the government-owned patents surveyed were patents held by the DoD).
43. See Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents
in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 232 (2006); Pulsinelli, supra note 39, at 394;
Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms
of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 97 (1999). This is also the argument set forth by Richard
Levin of.Yale University, who asserts that the Bayh-Dole Act's purpose was to assist in the
commercialization of government-funded inventions "'for the benefit of humanity."'
SCHACHT, supra note 42, at 9 (quoting Richard Levin). From the industry perspective, many
feared in the 1980s that U.S. industry was lagging behind other industrialized nations. See,
e.g., Powell & Owen-Smith, supra note 34, at 256.
44. See Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to
the Cost?, 43 Hous. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (2007) (asserting that the Bayh-Dole Act came
about to standardize "the rules regarding ownership of patents on inventions created using
federal research funds" (citing 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000)); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public
Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-
Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663 (1996); Litan et al., supra note 7, at 6; see
also SCHACHT, supra note 42, at 2-3 (stating that the Bayh-Dole Act was intended to create a
uniform national policy that would reduce bureaucracy and encourage commercialization of
inventions); Ducker, supra note 9, at 462 (referring to the Bayh-Dole Act as "the first-ever
federal uniform patent policy" and noting that the act replaced twenty-two separate statutory
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minority question whether the reported underlicensing of government-held
patents was overestimated due to a selection bias. Those scholars probably
are referring to patents that were held by the U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD), which implemented a pre-Bayh-Dole policy that made it much
easier for inventors to hold the patent than for the government to do so. 45
Finally, though the Bayh-Dole Act may have resulted in increased revenue




In the decade after the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, there was a
substantial increase in patenting by universities. 47 Scholars still debate
whether this increase stemmed solely from Bayh-Dole. 48 Patenting by
universities was on the rise prior to the passage of the Act, and, following
the passage of the Act, universities were seeing increases in the amount of
funding they received from industry. 49  Not surprisingly, these
circumstances led to a "chicken or the egg" debate. On one hand, the Bayh-
Dole Act might have caused the increase in university patenting; on the
other, the demand for the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act could have resulted
from increased patenting activity by universities. 50 However, comparing
university research in the United States during the 1980s with the progress
of the biotechnology industry in other countries after the passage of Bayh-
Dole lends credence to the idea that the Bayh-Dole Act in fact played a
provisions); Pulsinelli, supra note 39, at 398-99 (not stating that standardization was the
primary purpose, but acknowledging how differently the funding agencies operated and
discussing whether various agencies practiced a title policy or a license policy).
45. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 91 (noting that the data indicating that the
government-owned patents were underlicensed was based on DoD patents, which was
misleading because the DoD followed a patent policy that manifested a bias toward the
inventor retaining the patent rights to the invention); Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 1702.
46. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for
an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 457, 464 (2004) (noting that the
Act "was enacted to promote technology transfer through licensing, and not specifically to
enrich universities" (citing Eisenberg, supra note 44)).
47. Bagley, supra note 43, at 231; Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as Innovation System
Laboratories: California, Patents, and Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133,
1149 (2006) (referencing increases in economic activities that occurred after the passage of
the Act, but without drawing a conclusion about causation); University of Pittsburgh Office
of Technology Management, Inventors Handbook, X. Appendices, http://www.otm.pitt.edu/
sc.php?pagejtitle=X.+APPENDICES (last visited Mar. 24, 2009) (noting that universities
reported being issued fewer than 250 patents per year prior to 1980, but that in 1993,
universities responding to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM)
survey received an average of 1600 patents). But see MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 36
(noting that, while the Bayh-Dole Act accelerated the growth of patenting by universities,
the acceleration was still in line with a then-existing trend toward increased patenting by
universities).
48. See generally MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8.
49. Henderson et al., supra note 7, at 121-22.
50. Id. at 121.
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substantial role in the success of new biotechnology firms in the United
States.51
As is true with any major legislation, the Bayh-Dole Act is not without
its critics. The Bayh-Dole Act has been credited with creating the
biotechnology industry, but critics have pointed out that, by acting under
the authority of Bayh-Dole, universities have actually contributed to high
pharmaceutical costs (even as these actions were increasing the accessibility
of the new biopharmaceutical developments). 52 Other critics have blamed
the Bayh-Dole Act for the development of an "anticommons," due to the
excessive patenting of upstream research results, and for skewed research
agendas, delays in publication of research results, and increased conflicts of
interest for academic researchers. 53 Some critics acknowledge that the
Bayh-Dole Act led to financial benefits in the short term, but warn that the
Bayh-Dole Act will prove to yield a more detrimental effect on science in
the long term. 54
Although there is not an irrefutable causal relationship, the formation of
university TTOs increased and more patent applications for university
inventions were filed after the Bayh-Dole Act was passed.55 A debate arose
concerning whether the increase in patenting activity may have harmed the
quality of university inventions. A widely cited empirical study by Rebecca
Henderson, Adam Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg found a decrease in the
relative importance of university patents (as measured by the number of
citations to the patent) by the mid-1980s, 56 though this finding was later
revealed by a subsequent empirical study to have been the result of a
51. McManis & Noh, supra note 4, at 14-16. It is worth noting, however, that domestic
patenting increased across the board during the 1980s, which at least one empirical study has
attributed to a general surge in innovation during that time period. See Samuel Kortum &
Josh Lerner, What Is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?, 28 RES. POL'Y 1, 21 (1999).
52. de Larena, supra note 44, at 1387.
53. Mireles, supra note 47, at 1136-37; see also SCHACIHT, supra note 42, at 24-23
(citing critics expressing concerns about the patenting of research tools); Janet Rae-Dupree,
When Academia Puts Profit Ahead of Wonder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at BU4
(expressing concern that the Bayh-Dole Act has "distorted the fundamental mission of
universities" as universities begin to act more like corporate research laboratories);
Liebeskind, supra note 7. Janet Rae-Dupree's interpretation of this dispute in the New York
Times, however, promptly was criticized on the Patently-O Blog. Patently-O Blog,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/09/nytimes-univers.html (Sept. 8, 2008, 2:18 PM).
54. See, e.g., Ted Agres, The Costs of Commercializing Academic Research: Does
University Licensing Impede Life Science Research and Development?, SCIENTIST, Aug. 25,
2003, at 58 (quoting Paul Berg, Director Emeritus, Beckman Center for Molecular and
Genetic Medicine, Stanford University).
55. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 101, 106, 111 (providing tables showing post-1980
increases in patenting by the University of California, Stanford University, and Columbia
University); Litan et al., supra note 7, at 7 (referring to the development and increased
importance of university TTOs as unintended consequences of the Bayh-Dole Act); Sampat
& Nelson, supra note 13, at 22 (noting that there were 25 university technology transfer
offices (TTOs) in 1980 and over 200 in 1999).
56. Henderson et al., supra note 7, at 124.
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truncation bias.57  Likely as a result of the increased prevalence of
university TTOs, AUTM enjoyed a substantial growth in membership
following the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. 58
III. UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICES
The role, structure, and business model of university TTOs can vary
significantly depending on the university and the academic discipline
involved in the technology transfer activity that is taking place. Not
surprisingly, many critics have very strong opinions about what TTOs
should or should not be doing when it comes to patenting and licensing.
However, there is not a simple answer about what a TTO should be doing in
order to be more successful, since many factors contribute to a TTO's
success.59 One potential factor to consider is the quality and volume of the
resources available to the TTO. An empirical study by Joshua Powers
found that universities with older TTOs, larger TTOs, and more highly
reputable science and engineering faculty grant more licenses than
universities that are not as resource rich in those areas.60
TTOs have been criticized for being too driven by revenue generation. 61
A study that Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby conducted by surveying
57. Bhaven N. Sampat et al., Changes in University Patent Quality After the Bayh-Dole
Act: A Re-examination, 21 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 1371, 1379 (2003). One potential
explanation for the apparent initial decline in importance of university patents is that, on the
whole, university patents were being cited later than control group patents. Thus, the
original Rebecca Henderson et al. study did not encompass the full breadth of citations to
university patents. Id. at 1373-74. Bhaven Sampat and his colleagues further point out that a
longer delay before a patent is cited does not necessarily mean that the patent has less
importance and could actually indicate that the patent has more importance. Id. at 1388.
58. Sampat & Nelson, supra note 13, at 22 (noting that the AUTM had 150 members in
1984, compared with 1500 in 1999); cf COGR GUIDE, supra note 3, at 3 (specifying that the
AUTM was comprised of 2178 members in 1999). The Association of University
Technology Managers (AUTM) was founded in 1974 for the purpose of addressing the
concern that government-funded university inventions were not being adequately
commercialized. Association of University Technology Managers, About AUTM,
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfin?Section=About (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
59. Timothy R. Anderson, Tugrul U. Daim & Francois F. Lavoie, Measuring the
Efficiency of University Technology Transfer, 27 TECHNOVATION 306, 316 (2007). Timothy
Anderson and his colleagues completed an empirical study concerning the efficiency of
TTOs and provided suggestions about different areas to look into for further research on the
topic, including the organizational structure of the TTO, the possible effect of the region in
which the TTO is located, and the difference in efficiency between TTOs in the United
States and TTOs in other countries. Id.
60. Joshua B. Powers, Commercializing Academic Research: Resource Effects on
Performance of University Technology Transfer, 74 J. HIGHER EDUC. 26, 37-39 (2003).
61. See, e.g., Megan Ristau Baca, iBrief, Barriers to Innovation: Intellectual Property
Transaction Costs in Scientific Collaboration, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 4; see also
Lemley, supra note 19, at 618 (noting that university TTOs that are more focused on revenue
generation in the short run will tend to grant exclusive licenses); Litan et al., supra note 7, at
3-4 (stating that university TTOs have focused on revenue generation instead of on the
commercialization of university inventions). Robert Litan and his colleagues even go as far
as to refer to the current dominant TTO model as the "revenue maximization model." Id. at
7; cf Gilles Capart & Jon Sandelin, Models of and Missions for Transfer Offices from
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technology managers led to a finding that TTOs tend to place more
emphasis on licensing revenue when measuring the TTOs' success. 62
According to the survey, however, the perceived importance of
commercialization of inventions is just slightly less than that of licensing
revenue, indicating that TTOs take seriously their role in implementing the
Bayh-Dole Act.6 3
Among other obstacles, TTOs traditionally must overcome the difficulty
of breaking even-typically, it takes between five and ten years for a TTO
to break even, if it does at all. 64 This may be due to TTOs' extensive
patenting in search of the next "blockbuster" patent-for instance, patenting
every new biopharmaceutical substance in case one will be the next big
pharmaceutical breakthrough. 65 Blockbuster patents, however, are very
Public Research Organizations (2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www-
leland.stanford.edu/group/OTL/about/documents/JSMissionsModelsPaper-1.pdf (providing
eight possible points to consider when forming a mission statement for a TTO, but
specifically advising against making revenue generation a top priority). But see Dueker,
supra note 9, at 470 (stating that the primary goal of TTOs is commercialization and
designating revenue generation as a secondary concern); Powell & Owen-Smith, supra note
34, at 258 (listing the prospect of large financial returns as constituting "the most compelling
factor to universities" when universities consider how to manage research findings).
62. Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of
University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 243-45 (2001). The study looks at the
priorities that TTO managers place on various possible outcomes of TTO activities. The
other outcomes that the study requested that the managers consider were commercialization
of inventions; licenses executed; sponsored research; and patents. Id. at 244. Revenue from
licensing received the most rankings of "extremely important" or "moderately important" in
surveys where the TTO managers were asked to evaluate the importance of these outcomes
to TTOs and university administration. Id.
63. Id. at 245.
64. Bagley, supra note 43, at 234; Rae-Dupree, supra note 53 (noting that data indicate
that "fewer than half of the 300 research universities actively seeking patents have managed
to break even from technology transfer efforts," with two-thirds of all licensing revenue
tracked by the AUTM being spread between thirteen research universities (citing JENNIFER
WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2005)).
65. See de Larena, supra note 44, at 1381-82 (referring to the "lottery" effect, whereby
university TTOs file a large number of patent applications because of the small chance that
one might result in huge returns); see also MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 83-84 (referring
to the Research Corporation's attempts to maximize income by searching for blockbuster
patents as one reason for its failure); Litan et al., supra note 7, at 8 (stating that TTOs place
more emphasis on commercializing inventions that have the potential to result in the biggest,
fastest payback and less emphasis on inventions that have significant potential in the long
run). But see Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who Is Selling the Ivory Tower?
Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 MGMT. SCI. 90, 93 (2002) (referencing a
study that showed that many TTOs apply for patents only when they believe a licensee could
be found relatively easily); McManis & Noh, supra note 4, at 25 (discussing studies
revealing that only a minority of university inventions are patented, typically only after
careful market analysis to ensure that a licensee would be found); Cornell Center for
Technology Enterprise and Commercialization, Technology Transfer Process,
http://www.cctec.cornell.edu/inventors/techtransferprocess.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2009)
(providing a disclaimer for researchers that not all inventions would be considered
appropriate for patenting). One university TTO that does not engage in such extensive
patenting is the Technology Transfer Department (TTD) at the University of California at
Berkeley, which cites the high cost of filing patent applications (between $10,000 and
$20,000) as a reason for the TTD's inability to seek patents on all inventions submitted to
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rare, and patenting everything in the hopes of finding the next blockbuster
patent will become very expensive very quickly.66 For example, consider
the biopharmaceutical industry. Data suggests that for every FDA approved
drug, a company has typically reviewed between 5000 and 10,000
compounds.67  With essentially a one in 10,000 chance that a
biopharmaceutical compound would even become an FDA-approved drug,
the numbers would get outright miniscule if patenting decisions were based
on a desire to find a blockbuster drug, which requires product sales in
excess of $500 million per year.68
A. Impeding Innovation?
Some scholars have expressed concern that universities are obtaining too
many patents, leading to a risk of what Michael Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg termed a "tragedy of the anticommons." 69 Under this theory, an
anticommons would result in delayed innovation due to the excess of
patents that must be licensed before researchers can conduct innovative
research, since each patent along "the road to product development"
increases transaction costs. 70  Though not specifically referring to an
anticommons, William Brody (then-president of Johns Hopkins University)
also expressed a warning that excessive patenting by universities could
the office. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Technology Transfer: For Berkeley Lab
Researchers: How the Tech Transfer Licensing Process Works, http://www.lbl.gov/Tech-
Transfer/researchers/how-tt-works.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
66. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 83-84 (noting how difficult it is to predict
which patent will be the next blockbuster, and thus that a patent licensing portfolio should
not be managed with the sole goal of maximizing income); cf Goldie Blumenstyk, A
Contrarian Approach to Technology Transfer, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 12, 2004, at A27
(noting that tech transfer professional Gerald Barnett suggested that TTOs use university
technologies to build relationships with industry instead of looking for patents that will bring
in a large amount of revenue); Andy Guess, Easing Friction Over Tech Transfer, INSIDE
HIGHER ED, July 18, 2007, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/07/18/patent.
67. OFFICE OF TECH. TRANSFER, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., NIH RESPONSE TO THE CONFERENCE REPORT REQUEST FOR A PLAN TO
ENSURE TAXPAYERS' INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED (2001), available at
http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/policy-protecttext.html.
68. Id.
69. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998) (addressing the concern
that an excess of rights in a resource could lead to underuse). The idea of the anticommons
can be compared to multiple toll booths along the same road. When too many people hold
exclusionary rights in property (here, a patent), the anticommons theory holds that research
and innovation are impeded or outright halted because permission cannot be obtained from
all of the holders of exclusionary rights. See de Larena, supra note 44, at 1376, 1424-25
(stating that patents are sometimes appropriate, but that universities have been overpatenting
irresponsibly and should "patent less and license more").
70. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 699; see also Carl Shapiro, Navigating the
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting 8 (Univ. of Cal.,
Berkeley Competition Policy Ctr., Working Paper No. CPCOO-11, 2000), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPCOO-011 (discussing patent thickets and the blocking
effect that patents can have on downstream research, such as in the biotechnology industry
under the theory proposed by Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg).
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delay commercialization. 7 1 Heller and Eisenberg assert in their article that
a delay due to increasing privatization of upstream research is visible in
biomedical research. 72 Critics of the anticommons theory have asserted that
its effects have not actually been felt in the context of biotechnology. 73 An
empirical study conducted by John Walsh, Ashish Arora, and Wesley
Cohen concedes that the preconditions for an anticommons are present in
biotechnology. 74  However, the study then provides survey results
indicating that the patenting of research tools and other upstream
developments have generally not been viewed as having a substantial
negative effect on further developments in research.75 On the other hand, a
conflicting empirical study by Fiona Murray and Scott Stern examines
patent-paper pairs and concludes that citations to research findings in papers
decline after a patent is obtained on those results. 76 Murray and Stem's
conclusion suggests that a significant number of researchers may actually
choose to abandon a specific research project that would build on another
scientist's research paper after a patent associated with that paper is
granted. 77
One of the ways to potentially measure the effects of increased patenting
of university research is to examine the pace of knowledge exploitation by
industry: if it takes a long time for industry to take advantage of results
from university research, that might indicate that increased patenting by
universities has slowed down progress in that industry. 78 The results of
Kira Fabrizio's recent empirical study indicate that there has been a
slowdown of development in industry as university patenting has increased,
71. Brody, supra note 8, William Brody further suggests that it may actually be a bad
idea for universities to patent at all. Id.
72. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 698; see also Agres, supra note 54, at 59
(referencing a study that revealed a substantial percentage of researchers who reported being
deterred from researching genetic tests by fear of patent infringement).
73. See Heather Hamme Ramirez, Comment, Defending the Privatization of Research
Tools: An Examination of the "Tragedy of the Anticommons" in Biotechnology Research
and Development, 53 EMORY L.J. 359, 371 (2004) (defending the privatization of upstream
biotechnology developments by asserting that patents on such developments encourage
innovation rather than hinder it).
74. John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 293-96 (Wesley M.
Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003)
75. Id. at 298. The study, however, was primarily concerned with whether research tool
patents had the potential to cause the termination of studies that were in progress. The paper
does, however, acknowledge the possibility that high licensing costs could prevent
utilization of patented research tools by small start-up firms and university labs. Id. at 301-
02.
76. Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the
Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-commons Hypothesis, 63
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 648 (2007).
77. Id. at 673. The authors interpret this finding as evidence that patents have a negative
impact on the diffusion of scientific information. Id. at 683. The study examined patent-
paper pairs for scientific articles published in the journal Nature Biotechnology. Id. at 651.
78. Kira R. Fabrizio, University Patenting and the Pace of Industrial Innovation, 16
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 505, 506 (2007).
2182 [Vol. 77
TRANSFERRING INNO VA TION
which Fabrizio suggests may be due to delays relating to the universities'
property rights in the upstream research results. 79
In addition to the danger of an anticommons, it has also been observed
that overpatenting by universities could lead to universities being treated
more like commercial actors, resulting in loss of special allowances
traditionally afforded to universities, like the common-law experimental use
defense.80  The true negative impact of losing the common-law
experimental use defense, however, is still being debated. 81
If indeed universities are overpatenting, some scholars have proposed
turning to patent law to curb this trend and decrease the number of patents
being granted to universities. 82 To best understand how patent law may be
used to prevent overpatenting, one must first turn to a couple of theories
concerning the purposes that patents serve. Just as the Bayh-Dole Act may
be interpreted as having several purposes, scholars have noted that patents
may serve many purposes. Two purposes commonly addressed in the
context of the Bayh-Dole Act are patents as providing incentives for
commercialization 83 and patents acting as signals. 84
79. Id. at 524.
80. See Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 468; see also Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351,
1360-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that universities are in the business of research and
education and thus are not eligible for an experimental use defense based on use of a
patented invention in university research).
81. See Wendy Thai, Note, Toward Facilitating Access to Patented Research Tools, 6
MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 373, 375-76 (2004) (noting the tendency within industry against
suing universities for patent infringement). Compare Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 468
(warning that universities could face substantial costs if patent owners started suing
universities for patent infringement), and Ruth E. Freeburg, Comment, No Safe Harbor and
No Experimental Use: Is It Time for Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools?, 53 BUFF. L.
REV. 351, 393 (2005) (asserting that Madey eliminated the experimental use exemption for
research tools, that it is possible to have very broad patents on upstream technology, and that
the lack of a broad infringement exemption combined with the potential for broad patents
has the capacity to seriously stifle innovation in biotechnology), with Elizabeth A. Rowe,
The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special
Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 954 (2006) (arguing against special treatment for
universities by providing an experimental use exemption to begin with and noting the
unlikelihood that the Madey decision would result in any change to university lab behaviors
or any increase in infringement actions brought against universities), and Richard J. Bauer,
Comment, Why Not Try the Experiment and Stop Pointing the Finger? Modern University
Research Unaffected by a Narrow Experimental Use Exception, 24 TEMP. J. Sci. TECH. &
ENVTL. L. 121, 135 (2005). See generally JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND THE EXPERIMENTAL USE PRIVILEGE IN PATENT LAW 9-13 (2004),
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32651.pdf (reviewing the arguments in favor of and
against an experimental use exemption for universities).
82. See Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 468; Lemley, supra note 31, at 628; cf Golden,
supra note 37, at 108-10.
83. Garde, supra note 6, at 278 (differentiating between incentives to innovate
(commercialize) and incentives to invent); Kieff, supra note 40, at 698 (discussing patents as
incentives for commercialization); Lemley, supra note 19, at 620-2 1; McManis & Nob,
supra note 4, at 9. Other scholars have put forth the idea that patents may serve as incentives
to invent, incentives to disclose, and incentives to design around earlier inventions, in
addition to serving as incentives to commercialize. Richard Li-Dar Wang, Biomedical
Upstream Patenting and Scientific Research: The Case for Compulsory Licenses Bearing
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In examining the necessity of patenting by universities, the perceived
purpose served by the patents can provide significant insight. If patent
rights purely provide incentives for commercialization, universities clearly
should obtain patents so that the research results may be more effectively
commercialized. However, if patent rights only truly act as signals, then the
value to a university of holding an expansive patent portfolio is
questionable at best, since universities likely would possess patent
portfolios covering many different areas of study. Thus, a university would
have limited ability to use its broad patent portfolio as a signal of its
strength in any particular discipline. This is in part due to the wide variety
of channels that universities may use to engage in technology transfer apart
from patenting. 85 If patents only act as signals, then they are a much more
expensive method of signaling than the other well-established methods of
attracting industry attention to promote commercialization, such as
publications, consulting relationships between faculty and industry, and
industry-sponsored research.
In addition to the overarching purpose that patents serve, patents may
mean different things to different parties. For example, Katherine
Strandburg suggests that some university researchers seek patents not for
royalty profits, but instead for the purpose of maintaining exclusive control
over subsequent research. 86
When expressing concern about the potential for an anticommons or for
overpatenting in general, many scholars have suggested possible solutions.
One method that has been suggested is to reform patent law to make it more
difficult to obtain a patent to begin with, such as by strengthening various
requirements of patent law.87 Strengthening the utility requirement, for
Reach-Through Royalties, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 251, 265 (2008). However, these
alternatives have largely been dismissed in the context of the patenting by universities.
Golden, supra note 37, at 165-66.
84. See de Larena, supra note 44, at 1385 (noting that patents act as signals to show that
a university is "industry-friendly"); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625,
627-28 (2002) (exploring the various things that a patent portfolio can signal to others); see
also Golden, supra note 37, at 166-67. John Golden dismisses the incentive to invent theory
in favor of viewing patents as a means of attracting investment capital by exhibiting the
firm's money-making ability to potential investors. He refers to this as the "resources for
innovation" theory, which he says was also the driving theory behind passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act. Id. However, this theory essentially just encompasses the notion of using a patent
as a signal of the value of investing in the small firm. Id. at 167. But see Pulsinelli, supra
note 39, at 393.
85. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 179.
86. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology
Transfer, in 16 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN,
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93, 109 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005). The fact that WARF
and the Research Corporation were each founded for a similar purpose gives credence to this
theory. See supra Part I.A-B.
87. See Golden, supra note 37, at 110, 181 (suggesting stricter enforcement of the
patentability standards of novelty, nonobviousness, and utility, with heightened enforcement
of the utility requirement having "the greatest immediate potential for imposing sensible
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instance, might render it impossible to obtain a patent on upstream research
results, since such results are a significant distance away from being a
marketable product.88 One of the issues that has prompted this sort of
discussion is the patenting of gene sequences where it is not even known
what role a particular gene sequence performed. 89 In the context of gene
sequences, it has been proposed that a strengthened utility requirement
would prevent excessive patenting and thus leave the sequences freely
available for further research down the line.90 This proposal may be
criticized as being a slightly circular solution to the problem of
overpatenting, since it basically proposes reducing the number of patents
granted to universities by reducing the number of patents issued.
Other scholars have suggested either reforming the Bayh-Dole Act, or
exercising provisions of the Act that have traditionally not been exercised
fully, such as the march-in provision and the grant-back rights. 91 The Act,
for example, reserves a nonexclusive, royalty-free license to the federal
government, as well as any entity practicing the invention "for or on behalf
of the United States." 92 If this provision were exercised and universities
were deemed to be practicing an invention "on behalf of the United States,"
it could remove potential obstacles to university usage of certain patented
research materials. 93 Exercising the grant-back rights in this way, however,
would currently be very difficult due to the lack of a database listing
government-funded inventions that may be subject to this provision.94
Because of its broad language, the march-in provision is potentially
controversial. The provision contains language that authorizes the funding
agency to step in when necessary to achieve "practical application" of a
restrictions on prima facie patentability"); Lemley, supra note 3 1, at 628 (also encouraging
strengthening the utility requirement).
88. Golden, supra note 37, at 181.
89. Id. at 129.
90. Teresa M. Summers, Note, The Scope of Utility in the Twenty-First Century: New
Guidance for Gene-Related Patents, 91 GEO. L.J. 475, 493 (2003).
91. See de Larena, supra note 44, at 1377 (stating that wider usage of the march-in
provision and grant-back rights could help allay criticisms of university patenting); Lemley,
supra note 31, at 628; Pulsinelli, supra note 39, at 434 (noting that the NIH has never
exercised its march-in rights); Sabety, supra note 7, at 510; see also de Larena, supra note
44, at 1394-95 (suggesting use of the grant-back rights of the Bayh-Dole Act to give
universities the authority to practice inventions on behalf of the government, thus
eliminating many situations where universities might need to seek licenses before
conducting research). See generally National Institutes of Health, CellPro March-In Petition
Documents, http://www.nih.gov/icd/od/foia/cellpro/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009); CellPro and
Bayh-Dole March-In Rights, http://www.cptech.org/p/cellpro/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
But see Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 469-70 (noting that "[n]arrowing patents will only lead
people to apply for more of them" and suggesting instead the implementation of an
experimental use defense similar to fair use in copyright law); McManis & Noh, supra note
4, at 5 (criticizing commentators who say that there is a lack of empirical evidence showing
the benefits of Bayh-Dole while, at the same time, calling for legislative reform of Bayh-
Dole to fix what the authors refer to as "potential problems in the operation of the Act").
92. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2006).
93. Id.; MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 93; de Larena, supra note 44, at 1395.
94. de Larena, supra note 44, at 1395.
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government-funded invention. 95 However, the provision is flanked by
many qualifications and is generally viewed as a last resort. Thus, it is not
as drastic as it appears. 96 In the twenty-eight years since the Bayh-Dole Act
was passed, the NIH-though it is one of the major federal funding
agencies that provides research grants to universities 97-has never
exercised the march-in rights, despite such action being requested on
multiple occasions. 98
B. An Empirical Assessment of University TTOs
In order to analyze the range of activities, priorities, and performance of
TTOs, I collected data from the annual reports submitted to AUTM by
ninety-four institutions in the United States between 1996 and 2003. I
obtained information about the Licensing Survey, which, combined with the
data in the eight-year reports, provides an historical record of licensing-
related parameters from fiscal years 1996 to 2003. These parameters are
intended to measure the factors that influence the technology transfer
process, including licensing, entrepreneurship, and the like.
1. Summary Statistics
The summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent
variables is included in Table 1, as shown in the Appendix.99 The mean,
median, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation for each variable are
listed in this table. Note that the mean for virtually all the variables is
significantly larger than the median. In addition, the standard deviation is
much larger than the mean for all the dependent and independent variables.
95. 35 U.S.C. § 202(f)(2); see also de Larena, supra note 44, at 1392.
96. de Larena, supra note 44, at 1392; see also Michael S. Mireles, The Bayh-Dole Act
and Incentives for the Commercialization of Government-Funded Invention in Developing
Countries, 76 UMKC L. REV. 525, 530 (2007).
97. GAO, TECH TRANSFER, supra note 38, at 5. The General Accounting Office (GAO)
provides 1995 data showing that the NIH accounted for approximately 98% of the $6.5
billion in federal funds allocated to universities by the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS). The contributions from DHHS accounted for the most substantial share
of federal funding to universities in 1995, with the National Science Foundation (NSF) and
DoD contributing approximately $1.7 billion and $1.6 billion, respectively. Id.; see also
NAT'L Sci. FOUND., FEDERAL SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO UNIVERSITIES,
COLLEGES, AND NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: FY 2005 (2007), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsfO7333/pdf/nsfO7333.pdf.
98. For example, in 1997, CellPro asked the NIH to exercise its march-in rights under
Bayh-Dole, but the request was denied because there was no clear benefit. Garde, supra note
6, at 256. More recently, the NIH received letters from members of the public requesting
that the NIH exercise its march-in rights to control the pricing of the drug Ritonavir. The
NIH denied this request in 2004, concluding that such an action was an "'extraordinary
remedy.' that was not appropriate to address a pricing issue. Id. at 257 (quoting OFFICE OF
THE DIR., NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, IN THE CASE OF NORVIR® MANUFACTURED BY ABBOTT
LABORATORIES, INC. (2004) [hereinafter NORVIR REPORT], available at
http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/March-in-norvir.pdf); see also NORVIR REPORT, supra
(providing the official NIH response concerning the request).
99. All tables and figures referenced in Parts III.B. I to III.B.3 appear in the Appendix.
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The maximum values for all the variables are also more than an order of
magnitude greater than the mean. All these observations point to a single
conclusion-that the distribution of the data is strongly skewed to the right,
with a few large outliers for each variable of interest.
2. Performance Index
I have also formulated and calculated a Performance Index for each year
and for all years combined based on a composite measure of TTO
performance (see Appendix). In doing so, I took into account all the key
indicia of performance as specified by the TTOs in their reports to the
AUTM. The Performance Index is calculated as follows:
First, I calculated the Adjusted Net Income (adjincome) by using the
following formula:
adjincome = (lireed - lipdin - explgf + reimlg) - 12000 x licfte - 60000 x
othfte,
wherein:
lirecd is "Licensing Income,"
lipdin is "Income Paid to 3rd Party,"
explgf is "Expended Legal Fees,"
reimig is "Reimbursed Legal Fees,"
licfte is "Licensing FTE (full time equivalent)," and
othfte is "Other FTE (full time equivalent)."
I obtained the Performance Index (performancindex), which employs the
Adjusted Net Income, from the following formula:
performancindex = std(lcgnli) + std(actlic) + std (Icexci) + std(lcn-ex) +
std(invdis) + std(usptis) + std(strtup) + std(adincome) + std(nptapp) +
std(tptapp) + std(totexp),
wherein:
std is the normalized value, which is the distance of one data point from
the mean divided by standard deviation of the distribution,
lcgnli is "Licenses Generating Income,"
actlic is "Cumulative Active Licenses,"
Icexcl is "Licenses on Exclusive Basis,"
lcnex is "Licenses on Non-Exclusive Basis,"
invdis is "Invention Disclosures,"
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usptis is "U.S. Patents Issued,"
strtup is "Number of Start-Ups,"
nptapp is "New Patent Applications,"
tptapp is "Total Patent Applications," and
totexp is "Research Expenditures."
A summary of the descriptive statistics for the Performance Index is shown
in Table 2. The frequency histogram of the Performance Index of all years
and the boxplot of the Performance Index are shown in Figures 1 and 2. As
with the summary statistics for the independent and dependent variables, the
distribution of the Performance Index is skewed to the right, with a few large
values contributing to a dramatic shift to the right. The vast majority of
university TTOs are unprofitable or barely profitable in real terms. As shown
in Figures 3 and 4 and in Table 9, it is the performance of the top few
universities that are the real anomalies compared to all the other university
TTOs. Hence, and as we shall see in greater detail in the next section, the
existence of university TTOs cannot be justified simply on financial terms.
Rather, it is their overall economic impact on society through the societal
benefits that follow from transferring university-originating innovation that
provides a meaningful rationale for their existence.
3. Regression Results
Multiple linear regressions and the stepwise model selection by Mallows'
Cp criterion were performed to build up the best model for the dependent and
independent variables for each year and also for the sum of all the years. 100
Tables 3-8 and Tables 10-12, as shown in the Appendix, summarize the
regression results of the best models that were selected for each of the
dependent variables at issue. The performance index of each TTO in Table 3
strongly correlates to the number of licensing personnel (measured in full-
time equivalent, or FTE), the number of nonlicensing personnel (FTE), the
number of new patent applications, and the number of U.S. patents issued.
When the top and bottom 5% of the Performance Index are removed, the
negative correlation to research expenditures seen in Table 3 drops out in
Table 4, indicating that this negative correlation was an anomaly caused by
the outliers. Table 3 shows that the Performance Index is obtained by
devoting additional human resources to patenting activities; the performance
parameters constituting the index are heavily influenced by significant
patenting activity in terms of applying and obtaining U.S. patents.
This behavior is also seen in Table 5, where licensing income is
maximized by investing in licensing and nonlicensing personnel and by
increasing patenting activity. Note that the number of invention disclosures
100. See Appendix for additional details.
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in Table 5 does not seem to matter, since, without translating the invention
disclosures into issued patents under the approach followed by the TTOs,
there is no significant increase in licensing income. Table 6 shows the linear
regression results for running royalties, and it tracks the behavior for
licensing income very closely. It is clear from Table 7 that the more
aggressive a TTO is in obtaining patents and in enforcing its legal rights by
expending legal fees, the greater the likelihood that these legal fees expended
by the TTO will then be reimbursed in the future by a licensee.
It is clear from the summary statistics in Table 1 that the number of start-
ups that are generated by a TTO over the eight-year period is very small
(median of 1, mean of 2). The number of start-ups in Table 8 is strongly
predicted by the research expenditures, the number of invention disclosures,
and the age of the TTO. Table 8, when taken together with Tables 5 and 6,
shows that TTOs are not primarily concerned with entrepreneurship,
commercialization, or technology transfer, all of which can create significant
societal benefits. Rather, they are focused on maximizing revenue by
obtaining patents and licensing them.
Next, I examined the factors affecting the patent applications and issued
patents generated by universities, as indicated in Tables 10-12. Table 10
shows the variables that influence the number of issued U.S. patents. Table
10 illustrates that it costs approximately $7.7 million (1/0.12985) to obtain
one issued U.S. patent and that a TTO obtains one issued U.S. patent for
every seven (1/0.14916) invention disclosures that are submitted to it. This
result indicates that research expenditures at universities are directed toward
activities that do not necessarily generate patentable inventions. The TTOs,
on the other hand, are focused on activities within their control (pursuing both
patenting and licensing), and they are not engaged in activities that maximize
the transfer of university-originating innovation generated through research
expenditures for the benefit of society, outside of patent-centered licensing.
Hence, innovation products such as novel software are less likely to be the
focus of technology transfer activities to the extent that they are not embodied
in a software patent. More broadly, university innovation that is not reduced
to a patent or a patent application is not likely to be the subject of TTO
commercialization activities and other strategies to transfer that innovation
from the university to society at large.
IV. OTHER CRITICISMS OF UNIVERSITY PATENTING AFTER THE BAYH-
DOLE ACT
A. The "Relationship with Industry" Taint
With increased involvement in patenting and industry, research
universities have been described as now serving as both "creators and
retailers of intellectual property" and acting as both "resource and catalyst"
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for economic innovation.' 0 ' Some scholars have expressed concerns about
the effects of increased patenting and closer relations with industry. 102 In
2000, professors at the University of California at Berkeley met to express
concerns about the university's recent $25 million funding contract with
Novartis that effectively gave Novartis the first opportunity for licensing
about one-third of the discoveries that came out of the Department of Plant
and Microbial Biology in the College of Natural Resources. 10 3 A survey
revealed that over half of the faculty of the College of Natural Resources
were concerned about the possible negative effects on academic freedom
and sharing of ideas as a result of such substantial involvement by Novartis
in department research.'0 4 The architect of the deal with Novartis defended
the deal by asserting that it would enhance the university's research and
suggesting that substantial industry involvement was necessary because of
decreases in state and federal funding. 10 5 The Novartis contract lasted until
2003, and, in part because of the potential inefficiency of such wide-scale
funding, it seems somewhat unlikely that similar contracts will become
prominent and widespread in the future. 106
One of the concerns stemming from industry involvement is that sources
of research funding could require researchers to refrain from publishing
findings for a period of time. This concern has been confinned by at least
one empirical study. 10 7 David Blumenthal and his colleagues conducted a
survey of life sciences firms in 1994, which revealed that 82% of the firms
surveyed sometimes required information to be kept confidential so that a
patent application could be filed. 10 8 Fifty-eight percent of the firms stated
that they sometimes require that the results be kept confidential "for more
than six months in order to file a patent application."' 9 However, the
paper also asserts that university-industry collaboration is essential in order
to commercialize university research findings and to yield the optimal
benefit to the public. Blumenthal therefore urges the universities to
exercise more control over contracts with industry in order to ensure that
the universities protect academic priorities. 10
101. Powell & Owen-Smith, supra note 34, at 257, 258 (quoting Daryl Chubin, NSF
Division Director).
102. See Bagley, supra note 43, at 221 (blaming patents for increased secrecy among
academics); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored
Research, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1375-77 (1988) (noting the potential for compromise of
academic values as a result of sponsored research); Sheldon Krimsky, Book Review,
ACADEME ONLINE, Sept.-Oct. 2005, available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/
academe/2005/SO/BR/krim.htm (reviewing WASHBURN, supra note 64).
103. Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
2000, at 39, 39-40.
104. Id. at 40.
105. Id. at 40-41.
106. Andrew Lawler, Last of the Big-Time Spenders?, 299 SCIENCE 330, 331 (2003).
107. David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry
in the Life Sciences-An Industry Survey, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 368, 371 (1996).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 373.
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A few scholars have pointed out that increasing corporation-like behavior
by universities has the potential to harm the research arm of the university,
such as by causing universities to effectively forfeit the common-law
experimental use defense to patent infringement.I'I Other scholars, on the
other hand, point out the benefits of close interaction with industry. 112 For
example, even if the common-law experimental use exception is not a
viable defense, the close relationship between universities and their industry
counterparts has led to an informal research exception. Thus, university
researchers typically do not have to worry about being sued for patent
infringement by patent holders in industry. 113 Also, university researchers
have opportunities to work on more applied areas with more tangible
ramifications when they are working in conjunction with industry. 114
Several scholars have also noted a danger that the increased university-
industry interaction has tainted the direction of research, resulting in
skewed agendas at best and skewed results at worst. 115  Others have
countered such criticisms by pointing out that universities in this country
11. Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 464 (addressing the potential impact of Madey, which
effectively denied the common law research exemption to university researchers). Contra
McManis & Noh, supra note 4, at 40-42 & n. 188 (asserting that the Madey decision did not
change the experimental use exemption, but rather that it merely affirmed that universities
were not excused from the prohibition from "experimenting with" a patented research tool).
112. See Ducker, supra note 9, at 470.
113. See Garde, supra note 6, at 262; see also Eliot Marshall, Patent on HIV Receptor
Provokes an Outcry, 287 SCIENCE 1375, 1377 (2000) (noting that the chief executive of a
company that owns a patent on an HIV receptor gene has explicitly stated that the company
will not use the patent to block academic professionals from using the gene for research
purposes).
114. See Dueker, supra note 9, at 468-69.
115. See Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 464 (stating that, after the increased focus on patents
made universities look more like commercial actors, the Madey court treated universities like
commercial actors and took away the common-law experimental use defense); Golden,
supra note 37, at 180; Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Corporatization of the University: Distance
Learning at the Cost of Academic Freedom?, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 73, 100, 102 (2002)
(suggesting that the Bayh-Dole Act encourages unacceptable corporatization of universities,
and that the shift toward corporate goals alters the purpose of the research); Press &
Washburn, supra note 103, at 42 (providing an example of a researcher at Brown University,
David Kern, who lost his position at the university because he published his findings
concerning a new lung disease contracted by employees at the nylon company where Kern
worked as a consultant). Mildred Cho, a senior research scholar at Stanford, suggests that it
is rare to find researchers who come forward with research results in spite of pressure from
employers. Id. See generally SCHACHT, supra note 42, at 19-22 (noting that some critics
have expressed concern about conflicts of interest, publication delays, and skewed research
agendas as a result of close industry ties); Powell & Owen-Smith, supra note 34, at 268
(noting concerns that commercial activities could potentially "compromise scientific
impartiality by introducing the profit motive into research"); Strandburg, supra note 86. But
see MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 14-15 (implicitly denying any increasing
commercialization of universities based on further interaction with industry and pointing out
that American universities were always closely connected with industry, even to the extent
of coming up with entirely new fields of study to address problems faced by industry actors
(such as electrical engineering, first offered by MIT in 1882)); Thursby & Thursby, supra
note 65, at 102 (stating that an increase in the filing of patent applications should be
attributed more to the increasingly industry-friendly behavior of university administrators
than to a shift in the focus of researchers).
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have long maintained a close relationship with local industry, in some cases
even creating entirely new areas of academic study for the purpose of
addressing local industry concerns (such as the case of the emergence of
engineering training at universities).' 16
B. Harm to Academic Values
Scholars have also noted the danger of possible interference with
academic freedom and academic priorities."17 For example, a scientist's
behavior might be affected by the agenda or intentions of the industry actor
for whom the scientist is conducting research. In addition to concerns about
increasing corporatization of universities and possible overpatenting, 118
scholars have also expressed concerns that patenting by universities results
in the public paying twice for an invention: first, paying for the research;
and then, paying increased product and service costs to compensate for the
licensing fees." 19
One of the concerns of the scientific community is over the impact of
increased patenting on the behavior of researchers in terms of decreasing
participation by publication. A study by Fabrizio and Alberto Di Minin
revealed that patenting and publication are complementary activities, with
university-assigned patents correlating with increased publication. 120 If
there is no discernable trade-off between patenting and publication, is there
a trade-off between whether the researcher focuses on applied or basic
research? Results of a survey conducted by Marie Thursby and her
colleagues imply that there is not such a trade-off. 121
Another potential danger is that patenting could cause innovation to slow
in a particular field. A recent empirical study by Fabrizio, suggesting a
relationship "between an increase in university patenting and a slowdown in
the pace of knowledge exploitation in a given technology area," provides
support for this concern. 122
116. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 13, 15.
117. See Bagley, supra note 43, at 250-51 (asserting that the pressures of patenting can
lead to increased secrecy and harm the sense of community within academia); Lieberwitz,
supra note 115, at 128, 134 (maintaining that the corporatization of the university
undermines academic freedom); see also KEVIN G. RIVETrE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS
IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS 12 (2000) (noting the "potential
conflict of interest between academic freedom and the desire to profit from the research
fruits of that freedom"). But see Dueker, supra note 9, at 470 (asserting that working closely
with industry can benefit academia).
118. See supra Part IV.A.
119. See de Larena, supra note 44, at 1383.
120. Kira R. Fabrizio & Alberto Di Minin, Commercializing the Laboratory: Faculty
Patenting and the Open Science Environment, 37 RES. POL'Y 914, 926 (2008).
121. Marie Thursby, Jerry Thursby & Swasti Gupta-Mukherjee, Are There Real Effects of
Licensing on Academic Research? A Life Cycle View, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 577, 595-
96 (2007). The results imply that basic and applied research receive relatively equal
treatment throughout the faculty member's career, with more research being done in the
early stages of her career. If anything is the subject of a trade-off that places more emphasis
on applied research, it appears to be leisure time. Id. at 596.
122. Fabrizio, supra note 78, at 522.
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C. Universities as "Patent Trolls"
One of the dangers that university TTOs should keep in mind when
considering patenting and licensing is the danger that their actions could be
interpreted as the actions of "patent trolls." Although scholars consistently
have denied that universities are patent trolls, 123 the perception endures; a
university with a patent is typically a nonpracticing patent holder that seeks
licensees for the patents it holds, which closely resembles the behavior of
patent trolls.' 24 An entity that others perceive as a patent troll will appear
much less sympathetic, and cooperation and compromise might be more
difficult to come by. This perception is thus something that universities and
their TTOs should take great care to avoid.
V. RESTRUCTURING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ACTIVITIES
The primary focus of this essay is on evaluating, understanding, and
refocusing the overall efforts of university TTOs. The Bayh-Dole Act was
passed with a goal of promoting commercialization of government-funded
inventions, but several scholars have expressed concern that university
TTOs are focused more on revenue generation than on commercializing
inventions. As discussed in Part III and the Appendix, the AUTM data and
empirical analysis certainly support this conclusion. 125
There are several ways to structure a TTO, and many ways to engage in
technology transfer to promote the commercialization of university
inventions, but sources indicate that TTOs may not currently be taking full
advantage of the variety of tools available. Robert Litan and his colleagues
suggest that university TTOs should shift away from the current "revenue
maximizing" model of TTO operations and move toward a "value
maximizing model."' 26 The body of research indicates that TTOs would be
123. Jeremiah S. Helm, Comment, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls:
The Disparate Impact of eBay v. MercExchange on Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 331, 335 (2006) (differentiating universities from "patent trolls" because
universities are active innovators).
124. The term patent troll derives from the behavior of some entities in surprising
researchers or marketers with a patent and demanding that the infringer purchase a license.
See Lemley, supra note 19, at 613 n.2. Some individuals in various industries view
universities as patent trolls in this regard, especially when universities attempt to patent
everything regardless of what it is. One critic goes so far as to call universities "'crack
addicts' that are dependent on licensing revenue. See id. at 615, 622-24 (quoting Chuck
Fish, Comments at the Fordham Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property
Law and Policy (Apr. 22, 2006)).
125. See supra note 61; Part III.B (noting the views of several scholars concerning TTOs
and revenue generation).
126. Litan et al., supra note 7, at 13-15. The Litan study points out four potential value-
maximizing models: free agency (allow the inventors to shop around for a different TTO);
regional alliances; Internet-based approaches (for example, using a website like iBridge
Network, http://www.ibridgenetwork.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2009)); and allowing faculty
to retain title to their inventions and hoping that successful faculty occasionally donate to the
university. Id. The authors appear to suggest that the latter would be the best model for
TTOs to follow. Id.
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more effective if each TTO adapted its activities to the different demands of
various academic disciplines and/or technology sectors. If a TTO decides
to patent a given technology, the office has several choices concerning how
to license the patent: Should the patent be licensed exclusively, or
nonexclusively? If exclusive licensing is desired, should the licensing be
exclusive across all fields, should the exclusive license only apply to one
field, or should there perhaps be a time limit concerning exclusivity?
A. Decentralized or Centralized
TTOs can be structured in a variety of ways-the two primary
approaches are a centralized model and a decentralized model. One
approach that scholars have suggested using to adjust TTO activities to the
environment is to restructure the TTO in a decentralized manner. 127 A
decentralized office would likely make it easier to treat different disciplines
in different ways. This would probably solve the aforementioned problem
of TTOs treating all academic fields in the same way, since each TTO
department would possess expertise in the most effective methods of
carrying out technology transfer in the given academic discipline or
technological field.
One concern arising from the centralized versus decentralized question
pertains to staffing. Some scholars have examined TTOs and concluded
that TTOs struggle because the offices are not staffed adequately. 128 A
decentralized office might be more expensive to staff if the university were
to make efforts to hire individuals with expertise in the various specific
academic areas. However, staffing a decentralized office with individuals
with experience in the focal areas would likely pay for itself over time since
the office would engage in fewer wasted efforts based on lack of
understanding of the academic specialty.
B. Decision Making Based on an Area of Technology
A majority of scholarly articles in this area examine university patenting
in the context of the life sciences, especially biotechnology and
127. See id. at 11 (stating that using a single, central office would not optimize
commercialization); see also Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab: Why
Universities Should Take a Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. REv.
407, 419-20 (2007). TTOs on campuses could be structured using a decentralized model,
where different academic disciplines would be handled by their own technology transfer
teams, or by using a centralized model, where one technology transfer team would handle all
of the tech transfer across the entire university. As Kristin Osenga indicates in her article,
universities might also elect to have their TTO tasks handled by outside entities. Id. Most
scholars who discuss these models do not use the terms "centralized" and "decentralized,"
but several express concern with the concept of the centralized model. But see Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and
Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1161, 1229 (2000) (noting that university TTOs can act as
middlemen to help collaboration efforts between different university areas, indicating a
potential strength of the centralized TTO).
128. See de Larena, supra note 44, at 1412; Osenga, supra note 127, at 433-34.
2194 [Vol. 77
TRANSFERRING INNO VA TION
biopharmaceuticals. 129 This is in part because the life sciences account for
a substantial amount of the patenting done by universities,130 which might
be attributed to the nature of the fields within the life sciences. For
example, the investment required to develop a compound in the
pharmaceutical industry is very high, 131  but a whole finished
pharmaceutical product might contain just a single patented compound and
have the potential for a large amount of revenue. 132 This results in a huge
potential value for one exclusively licensed biopharmaceutical patent if that
patent eventually leads to development of a new "blockbuster" drug.'
33
In other disciplines, however, the same pattern does not hold true. In the
engineering fields, for example, a single patent may be vital to a finished
product, while only being one of many such patents required. Therefore,
the comparative value of each individual patent is consequently much
lower. 134 Furthermore, in an empirical study, Ajay Agrawal and Rebecca
Henderson examined patterns of patenting and publishing in two
engineering-related departments at MIT and found that patenting was
typically not as important as publication in transferring knowledge from the
university to the public. 135 With the exception of biotechnology,
pharmaceuticals, and possibly nanotechnology (though this has not been
determined conclusively, since the field is still very new), most industries
do not view patents as being important for technology transfer. 136 It is also
widely accepted that different industries rely on patents to different degrees
to appropriate benefits from the marketplace for their innovation. For these
reasons, a TTO should base its evaluation of research results (patent or do
129. See, e.g., Dueker, supra note 9; Golden, supra note 37; Christopher M. Holman,
Biotechnology's Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318
(2006); Pulsinelli, supra note 39; see also COGR GUIDE, supra note 3, at 8 (describing the
social importance of Bayh-Dole by citing an AUTM survey that found that 70% of the active
licenses of respondent universities were in the life sciences). But see Lemley, supra note 3 1;
Sabety, supra note 7.
130. See Powell & Owen-Smith, supra note 34, at 259-60 (noting that, from 1989-1994,
the three most common classes of inventions for which universities pursued patents were in
the life sciences field).
131. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 19-20 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/
doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf.
132. See de Larena, supra note 44, at 1432-33 (noting that pharmaceuticals tend to be big
winners in technology transfer, and also that they are the biggest investment risks).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Ajay Agrawal & Rebecca Henderson, Putting Patents in Context: Exploring
Knowledge Transfer from MIT, 48 MGMT. Sci. 44, 59 (2002). The two departments were the
Department of Mechanical Engineering and the Department of Electrical Engineering and
Computer Science. Id. at 45.
136. See SCHACHT, supra note 42, at 3-4; Sampat & Nelson, supra note 13, at 32. Wendy
Schacht notes that the importance of patents varies across different industries, and that an
industry's view of the importance of patents depends on the monetary and time costs
associated with duplicating the fruits of labor in the industry. Patents, she continues, are
valued more highly by industries with low duplication costs. SCHACHT, supra note 42, at 3-
4.
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not patent, nonexclusive or exclusive, etc.) at least in part on the
technological field. 13 7
One of the lessons that the Research Corporation learned the hard way
was that the methods used for licensing patents in one academic discipline
do not necessarily work as well in other academic disciplines. 138 The
Research Corporation's techniques for patenting and licensing in all areas
were the same methods they successfully used in patenting and licensing in
the life sciences, but these methods did not translate as well into areas like
electrical engineering. 139 Thus, even though the majority of "successful"
patents granted to universities are in the life sciences area, 140 technology
transfer activities will remain predominately unsuccessful if university
TTOs treat all academic areas as if commercialization can best be
accomplished using the same methods as those that succeed in the life
sciences.
Apart from considerations pertaining to the general research area, the
specific stage of development is also important. Research results that are
further away from ultimate commercial usage are commonly referred to as
upstream inventions. Many scholars have examined whether TTOs should
patent "upstream" inventions, and several scholars tend to favor
nonexclusive licenses for upstream technology. 14 1  Other scholars,
137. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 190-91 (instructing TTOs to adjust their IP policies
to accommodate differences among various areas instead of treating research in all areas just
like biomedical research).
138. Id. at 69 (looking at the history of the Research Corporation and concluding that
expertise in the patenting/licensing process of one area did not translate to comparable
strength in other areas); see also Lemley, supra note 19, at 611-12 (urging that the goal of
TTOs should be maximizing the social impact of technology instead of profiting from
licensing, and, thus, patenting should be conducted based on however the most positive
effect will be realized); Sabety, supra note 7, at 513-14 (noting that wide exclusive patenting
works well in the pharmaceutical area, but not as well when the patent is just one of many
patents comprising a cumulative technology required for the finished product).
139. See MOWERY ETAL., supra note 8, at 69.
140. GAO, TECH TRANSFER, supra note 38, at 19 (noting in 1998 that visits to ten major
universities revealed that the more "marketable" technologies tended to be in the life
sciences and that a 1996 AUTM survey revealed that 80.2% of the technology licensing
revenues of survey respondents came from inventions in the life sciences).
141. Lemley, supra note 19, at 617-18 (suggesting that "enabling technologies" be
licensed nonexclusively to allow room for improvement); Pulsinelli, supra note 39, at 412
(warning that exclusive licenses on patents of basic discoveries or tools can interfere with
scientific progress); Sabety, supra note 7, at 508-09 (encouraging nonexclusive licenses for
foundational intellectual property in the nanotechnology area). But see MOWERY ET AL.,
supra note 8, at 8 (discouraging the patenting of research tools); Golden, supra note 37, at
177 (noting that there is evidence indicating that patents on research materials impede
downstream development); Rai, supra note 43, at 112, 136-44 (noting that MIT has a
presumption against patenting upstream products and providing a balancing test for whether
patenting would be desirable: if (transaction costs) + (creativity costs) < (invention costs) +
(pure development costs), then patent protection is probably desirable); McManis & Noh,
supra note 4, at 46-47 (citing a recent article that characterized biotechnology science
research results as an "'uncongested common resource"' (quoting David A. Adelman, A
Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985, 986
(2005)); Brody, supra note 8 (stating that nonexclusive licenses with reasonable fees to
cover the cost of research would be a fair and equitable proposal, but that such a scheme
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however, deny that patenting upstream technology causes any problem at
all.' 4 2 This debate is fueled in part by seemingly conflicting results from
two studies, one from 1998 and one from 2003, that came to considerably
different conclusions concerning whether patents on upstream research
frustrated research attempts further downstream.' 4 3 Charles McManis and
Sucheol Noh, however, strongly criticize both studies, suggesting that the
studies used unreliable methods to measure the level of harm to subsequent
research. 144
VI. ADDITIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER METHODS
One of the current weaknesses of university TTOs is that some offices
may treat exclusive licensing of patents as being the cornerstone of
technology transfer. 145  In fact, there are several technology transfer
methods, apart from patents, some of which might be more effective for
commercialization than patenting in certain situations. 146 One of the issues
that TTOs regularly face is that faculty researchers may not always disclose
their research to the TTO. Instead, these faculty members might use
might provide "greater benefit to large companies rather than small ones"). See generally
Xavier Becerra, Talking Points, The Genomic Research and Accessibility Act (H.R. 977)
(n.d.), available at http://becerra.house.gov/NR/rdonlyres/556A7E45-4762-42EC-807C-
7248F70E8787/0/TalkingPoints.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2009) (listing harmful effects on
downstream research caused by patenting of genes); Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 464
(referring to TTOs as "the academic equivalent of [universities'] football teams" and
explaining that profit margins give TTOs incentives to seek patent protection for all
university inventions, including upstream developments).
142. See RIVETrE & KLINE, supra note 117, at 22-25 (stating that granting patent rights to
knowledge assets does not stifle innovation and is in fact a very effective way of "promoting
innovation, knowledge sharing, and economic growth"); Holman, supra note 129, at 330
(noting that material transfer agreements are more likely to impede research than patents on
upstream developments); see also McManis & Noh, supra note 4, at 24 (citing studies
showing that few researchers had experienced delays caused by patents, but that a
considerable portion of researchers had experienced delays due to material transfer
agreements).
143. McManis & Noh, supra note 4, at 31-32.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Dueker, supra note 9, at 497. But see ASS'N UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS,
AUTM U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY: FY 2006, at 32 (2007) [hereinafter AUTM
SURVEY], available at http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FY_2006_Licensing
_ActivitySurvey&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfrn&ContentlD=1804 (showing that, as
of fiscal year 2006, 61% of the licenses executed by U.S. universities were nonexclusive
licenses).
146. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 190. Another reason why TTOs should
consider alternatives to patenting stems from sociological considerations, since at least one
empirical study notes that universities with higher prestige have licensed more of their
research findings than less prestigious universities. Wesley David Sine, Scott Shane & Dante
Di Gregorio, The Halo Effect and Technology Licensing: The Influence of Institutional
Prestige on the Licensing of University Inventions, 49 MGMT. SCi. 478, 494-95 (2003).
Wesley David Sine and his colleagues conclude that technology transfer is facilitated by the




informal technology transfer methods on their own. 147 Interactions with
directors of TTOs led Richard Jensen, Jerry Thursby, and Marie Thursby to
the conclusion that higher-quality faculty members are actually more likely
not to disclose their findings to the TTO at all. 148  Three informal
technology transfer methods include working directly with industry
personnel to commercialize technology, coauthoring publications with
industry personnel, and serving as paid consultants to private firms. 14 9
Albert Link, Donald Siegel, and Barry Bozeman explored the participation
of faculty researchers in informal technology transfer. 150 Their results
indicated that male, tenured faculty members who spend a lot of time on
grant-related research are more likely to engage in all three of the above
methods of informal technology transfer. 151 The authors suggest that the
TTOs of universities should reach out to accomplished faculty members
and encourage them to use formal technology transfer methods, perhaps by
changing the incentive structures. 152 An empirical study by Siegel, David
Waldman, and Link suggests that promotion and tenure policies, as well as
a university's policy for distributing royalties and equity, are important
factors in determining whether faculty members will disclose their
inventions. 153
A. Nonpatent Methods: Informal Interactions, Publishing, and Start-Ups
In addition to patenting, technology transfer occurs in many different
ways, including sponsored research, publication in research journals, the
creation of start-up companies, and relationships (professional or informal)
between inventors and industry representatives. 154 This essay includes
147. Albert N. Link, Donald S. Siegel & Barry Bozeman, An Empirical Analysis of the
Propensity of Academics to Engage in Informal University Technology Transfer, 16 INDUS.
& CORP. CHANGE 641, 642 (2007).
148. Richard A. Jensen, Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Disclosure and Licensing
of University Inventions: 'The Best We Can Do with the S**t We Get to Work With,' 21
INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 1271, 1272 (2003); see also Stuart D. Allen, Albert N. Link, & Dan T.
Rosenbaum, Entrepreneurship and Human Capital: Evidence of Patenting Activity from the
Academic Sector, 31 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 937, 943-48 (2007) (examining
the results of an empirical study that found that tenured, older, white, or Asian male faculty
members were more likely to seek patents, but not necessarily through the university TTO).
The inclination of faculty members toward more entrepreneurial activities may be related to
the extent to which a university department emphasizes entrepreneurial activities. Martin
Kenney & W. Richard Goe, The Role of Social Embeddedness in Professorial
Entrepreneurship: A Comparison of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at UC
Berkeley and Stanford, 33 RES. POL'Y 691, 704 (2004).
149. Link et al., supra note 147, at 647.
150. See generally id.
151. Id. at 651.
152. Id. at 652-53.
153. Donald S. Siegel, David Waldman & Albert Link, Assessing the Impact of
Organizational Practices on the Relative Productivity of University Technology Transfer
Offices: An Exploratory Study, 32 RES. POL'Y 27, 44-45 (2003).
154. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 33; de Larena, supra note 44, at 1413-14
(noting that "the inventor is typically the best link to potential licensees," so TTOs should
focus on forming relationships and not just promoting licenses); Powell & Owen-Smith,
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start-up companies in the technology transfer category even though start-up
firms may be supported by a corresponding patent application because start-
up firms are often founded and run by the faculty inventor or postdoctoral
associates. Thus, the start-up firm performs much of the initial
development to make the technology more economically desirable to
companies that ultimately may market the technology as a new product.1
55
Additionally, start-up firms may obtain a license for patented technology
through alternative means, other than by paying royalties and licensing
fees-such as by providing the university with an equity interest in the
start-up firm. 156  Not only are start-up firms an effective method of
commercializing technology, but supporting start-up firms also furthers one
of the central purposes of the .Bayh-Dole Act by giving preference to small
businesses when seeking to develop federally funded inventions. 
157
Since start-up companies serve an important role in the
commercialization of university research results, it might be expected that a
considerable amount of university technology licensing would be to start-up
firms. However, the most recent data from the AUTM indicate that only
approximately 15% of the licenses executed in fiscal year 2006 were to
start-up firms.158 This observation is entirely consistent with the data and
empirical analysis presented in Part III and the Appendix. It also leads to a
question of how involvement in start-up firms may be increased. Dante Di
Gregorio and Scott Shane conducted an empirical study concerning start-up
companies and found that two university policies were correlated with
increased start-up formation: paying to inventors a lower share of royalties
supra note 34, at 258 (noting that patents may not be the best way of handling intellectual
property in cutting edge fields and suggesting research parks and the acceptance of equity in
start-up companies as better alternatives); Strandburg, supra note 86, at 114-16; Litan et al.,
supra note 7, at 8-9; Capart & Sandelin, supra note 61 (urging TTOs to focus on a variety of
methods of technology transfer apart from patenting, "including business development,
coaching, incubator facilities, seed capital funds, science parks, etc."); see also RIVETTE &
KLINE, supra note 117, at 36 (quoting Henry Garrana, Vice President of Legal and
Intellectual Property for Dell, as saying that a successful IP program requires that the holder
"focus on the things that you do that bring real value to the market").
155. See Litan et al., supra note 7, at 9-10 (describing university "spin-offs" as small
firms that emerge as a result of attempts to commercialize an early stage of university
invention). Litan and his colleagues acknowledge that only 3376 of these spin-off
companies were created between 1980 and 2000, but that these spin-offs are
disproportionately high-performing companies-68% of the spin-offs created during that
period were still operational in 2001, and 8% of spin-off companies eventually went public.
Eight percent is a much higher percentage than that for U.S. enterprises generally. Id.
156. See GAO, TECH TRANSFER, supra note 38, at 13 (expressing concerns, however, that
relationships with start-up companies might interfere with the university's mission by
creating conflicts of interest by shifting the focus to making money instead of research); de
Larena, supra note 44, at 1416. See generally Maryann Feldman et al., Equity and the
Technology Transfer Strategies of American Research Universities, 48 MGMT. Sci. 105
(2002) (using empirical methods to examine the increasing acceptance of equity in lieu of
licensing fees by university TTOs).
157. Gulbrandsen, supra note 15, at 1154 (also noting that in many situations, start-up
companies may be the only way to commercialize an invention).
158. AUTM SURVEY, supra note 145, at 31.
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and allowing the university to accept equity from a firm in lieu of
traditional reimbursement for the costs of licensing and patenting.159
Even in an area as patent-heavy as pharmaceuticals, university
researchers who form start-up firms may have difficulty securing funding
from venture capitalists because of the uncertainty in the drug development
area. 160  The difficulty of commercializing early-stage pharmaceutical
developments led to the formation of PharmaSTART in 2003, which states
as one of its objectives the intention "to facilitate development and
translation of drug[s] from within Universities and Medical Centers into
industry."161
When it comes to taking more active roles in the commercialization
process with start-up firms, TTOs generally have a few models that they
can adopt. Some may take a hands-off approach, others may take a more
hands-on approach, and still others may take an "in-up-to-the-elbows"
approach. 162 Depending on the approach taken, a university TTO that
wishes to increase start-up formation may face a seemingly paradoxical
trade-off, since at least one empirical study has found that start-up
formation is more common at universities that provide a low share of
royalties to inventors. 163 However, another empirical study has found that
there is a generally held belief that faculty are not adequately rewarded for
participating in technology transfer activities, and, thus, faculty may be less
likely to disclose their inventions in the absence of higher royalty rates. 164
159. Dante Di Gregorio & Scott Shane, Why Do Some Universities Generate More Start-
Ups than Others?, 32 RES. POL'Y 209, 222 (2003). One other factor found to correlate
positively with the creation of start-up firms was the university's level of academic prestige.
Id. However, university TTOs potentially have more of an ability to control the two policy
factors cited above-inventors receiving less royalties and universities' acceptance of equity.
160. Andrew Pollack, Three Universities Join Researcher to Develop Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2003, at Cl (providing information on the formation of PharmaSTART through the
collaboration of Stanford University, the University of California at San Diego, the
University of California at San Francisco, and SRI International, a nonprofit research
institute).
161. Id.; PharmaSTART, http://www.pharmastart.org/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
PharmaSTART's website now lists the University of California, Berkeley and the Institute
for Quantitative Biomedical Research among its participating institutions, in addition to SRI
International, Stanford University, University of California, San Diego, and University of
California, San Francisco.
162. Almut von Biedermann, U.S. Excellence in New Venture Creation: What
Technology Transfer Means in the Early 21 st Century 3-4 (2004) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.publicforuminstitute.org/nde/sources/New%20Venture%20Creation
%20-%202 1 Century%20Tech%20TransferA.vB 1 204.pdf. In a hands-off model, the
licensing professionals view the formation of the start-up as just another licensing deal. In a
hands-on model, the licensing professionals would help form the business plan for the start-
up and possibly also help secure funding. A licensing office following an "in-up-to the-
elbows" approach would play a more entrepreneurial role, writing the business plan,
recruiting management, and securing funding for the start-up from an early stage. The latter
model is the model used at Yale University, and it has been very successful at that
institution. Id.
163. Di Gregorio & Shane, supra note 159, at 213.
164. Siegel et al., supra note 153, at 42-43.
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The stage at which the TTO gets involved could have an impact on the
TTO's success. For instance, Jensen and his colleagues found that the
higher-quality faculty tended to disclose more inventions at the proof of
concept stage, but that "universities with greater net income have a smaller
proportion of disclosures licensed in the proof of concept stage," perhaps
due to TTOs discouraging the disclosure of early-stage inventions.1 65
Recently, some universities have adopted another method of assisting in the
commercialization of early-stage developments: establishment of proof of
concept centers. 166 Proof of concept centers are designed to facilitate "the
spillover and commercialization of university research," providing funding
for early stage developments that might be too upstream to receive financial
backing from angel investors and venture capitalists. 167
Proof of concept centers are a developing system, but many of the
alternative methods for technology transfer have been used in universities
for many decades. For instance, industries have provided support for
university research through sponsored research for a long time. 168 The
popular colloquialism "publish or perish" captures the long-standing
importance of publication within academia as a method of promoting the
open sharing of scientific data.' 69 Examination of the options shows that
instead of defaulting to the pursuit of patents, university TTOs may better
serve the purpose of commercialization of university inventions if the TTOs
focus equally on engaging in other methods of technology transfer.
B. Exclusive or Nonexclusive Licenses
Even when a patent is pursued, there are a variety of ways that TTOs can
approach patenting and licensing to optimize commercialization of
inventions. As explored in Part V.B, this decision is greatly influenced by
165. Jensen et al., supra note 148, at 1273-74.
166. Christine A. Gulbranson & David B. Audretsch, Proof of Concept Centers:
Accelerating the Commercialization of University Innovation 4 (Jan. 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid= 1090575.
167. Id.; see also Litan et al., supra note 7, at 9-10 (noting that universities may need to
play a larger role in nurturing early-stage start-ups due to venture capitalists' preference
toward funding technology that is closer to commercialization).
168. See Maryann Feldman & Pierre Desrochers, Research Universities and Local
Economic Development: Lessons from the History of the Johns Hopkins University, 10
INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 5 (2003) (noting that medical research at Johns Hopkins University
was predominantly privately funded until the government became more active in university
research following World War II).
169. See Bagley, supra note 43, at 218 (referring to the communal norms that promote the
importance of publishing in order to promote the open sharing of scientific data); see also
Eisenberg, supra note 102, at 1364 (listing the freedom to publish as being one of the core
freedoms in the idea of "academic freedom"). Publishing, however, can have a negative
impact on future attempts at patenting if the publication occurs long enough before the patent
application such that it qualifies as prior art. See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding that slides accompanying a poster presentation at a conference
amounted to a "printed publication" of the research findings for purpose of prior art); see
also de Larena, supra note 44, at 1401 (noting that faculty members are sometimes pressured
to file provisional patent applications prior to publication of research results).
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the area of study. In some disciplines, licensing a patent exclusively may
yield optimal results; in others, nonexclusive licensing would prove most
effective; still others may best be commercialized by not patenting at all and
relying on any number of the above discussed methods of technology
transfer to commercialize the development. 7 0
Nonexclusive licensing may be desirable when the technology at issue is
an upstream development or a ground-breaking innovation in a particular
area since, in those circumstances, the greatest benefit will likely be found
by licensing the technology to many developers. 17 1 An exclusive license,
on the other hand, may be the best choice when the technology at issue is
something that would require a large investment to develop its marketable
potential.172 Under such conditions, an exclusive license would assure the
investors that they could devote time and money to development without
having to worry that a free-riding competitor could swoop in at the last
minute and take their market share before they could recoup their
significant research and development investment through sales.173 One area
where exclusive licensing may be the most effective means of
commercializing a development is in pharmaceuticals, where it can take
over a decade and cost in the hundreds of millions of dollars to develop a
final product. 174 Exclusive licenses do not necessarily result in higher
170. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 176-78 (reviewing an analysis of case studies
that indicated that patenting is not necessary to obtain value from research tools and is not
likely to help with electronics); Lemley, supra note 19, at 612 (noting additional possible
limits on exclusivity, such as field-specific exclusivity, exclusivity for a limited term, and
exclusivity that only applies to commercial sales); see also id. at 627 (suggesting that
exclusive patents would not be appropriate in nanotechnology due to the many industries
where the same nanotechnology products may be used); Powell & Owen-Smith, supra note
34, at 260 (listing three motivations underlying university licensing of research results: a
desire to increase research in an area with limited commercial value, where broad licensing
is desirable; a focus on entrepreneurial motivations that would lead to exclusive licenses
being granted to a start-up company; and use of the discoveries as magnets to draw more
industry-sponsored research). But see Dueker, supra note 9, at 497 (concluding that
"nonexclusive licenses are viable only when inventions are revolutionary or broadly-
enabling"); Strandburg, supra note 86, at 112-13 (suggesting that exclusive patent rights
play a positive role in the commercialization of the results of curiosity-driven research).
171. See Mireles, supra note 96, at 536 (suggesting that universities should choose to
grant exclusive licenses only when an exclusive license is "necessary to secure funding for
commercialization"). But see Dueker, supra note 9, at 497 (referring to nonexclusive
licenses as the exception, viable only with inventions that are pioneering or broadly
enabling).
172. See Mireles, supra note 96, at 536.
173. Aaron Miller, Repairing the Bayh-Dole Act: A Proposal for Restoring Non-Profit
Access to University Science, 2005 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 093001,
http://www.bc.edulbc-org/avp/law/st-org/iptf/articles/index.html.
174. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 131, at 19-21; U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., New Drug Development Timeline (n.d.), available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/
graphics/newdrugspecial/drugchart.pdf; Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and
Other Market Failures: A Case for a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent
Property, 48 How. L.J. 579, 601 (2005) (estimating that it costs between $100 and $500
million to develop and market a single drug); Robert F. Service, Surviving the Blockbuster
Syndrome, 303 SCIENCE 1796 (2004) (noting that clinical research alone during the
development of a new biopharmaceutical product now takes approximately seventy-five
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revenues, as evidenced by a case study of patenting activity at Columbia
University, Stanford University, and the University of California. The
study revealed that the patents that accounted for the largest shares of the
licensing revenues at their respective institutions were licensed widely on a
nonexclusive basis.175
Even if the most effective means of commercializing is to grant an
exclusive license, TTOs must still decide what type of exclusive license to
grant. A purely exclusive license would exclude potential developers in all
fields from licensing the patented item. A field-exclusive license, on the
other hand, would not prevent entities in other fields from obtaining a
license. A field-exclusive license might be most effective in an area like
nanotechnology, where the building blocks of the discipline may be used in
research and development across many different fields. 176 There are
several other variations on exclusive licensing that have been used over the
years, such as exclusivity that does not bar potential developers from
developing the technology for use in developing countries, or license
agreements that provide a specific time frame for exclusivity. 177
C. Royalty-Free Licensing
One of the considerations in licensing a patent is the amount of royalties
that will be charged. A typical model would reserve the first cut of
royalties to the university as compensation for the costs of patenting, with
later royalty amounts being distributed between the inventor, the TTO, and
other departments of the university.l7 8 Some scholars have examined the
months); PhRMA, Innovation, http://www.phrma.org/innovation/ (last visited Mar. 24,
2009) (explaining that obtaining approval for a new drug takes an average of fifteen years of
research and development and costs more than $800 million).
175. David C. Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S.
Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL'Y 100,
115 (2001). Most of the licenses executed by the universities in this study were exclusive
licenses, but the highest licensing revenue came from the Cohen-Boyer patents (licensed
nonexclusively by Stanford and University of California) and Richard Axel's
cotransformation patent (licensed nonexclusively by Columbia University). MOWERY ET AL.,
supra note 8, at 155-58; Mowery et al., supra, at 115.
176. See Lemley, supra note 31, at 623-24.
177. See Lemley, supra note 19, at 612 (listing the options of field-specific exclusivity,
exclusivity for limited terms, or exclusivity that is limited to commercial sales); see also
Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach
for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1075-76 (2005) (providing
examples of universities that have made specific licensing choices in the interest of
increasing the availability of treatments for neglected diseases in low- to middle-income
countries). -
178. See OFFICE OF TECH. TRANSFER, UNIV. OF CAL. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UC
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 10, 12 (2007), available at
http://www.ucop.edu/ott/genresources/documents/OTTRptFY07.pdf (listing the different
components of royalties and licensing fees at the University of California, which reported
$97.6 million in revenue from license fees and royalties in fiscal year 2007); Liebeskind,
supra note 7. See generally Stanford University Office of Technology Licensing, Exclusive
Agreement 4 (n.d.) (unpublished sample agreement), available at http://otl.stanford.edu/
industry/resources/exclusive.pdf (providing the format of the contract segments pertaining to
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possibilities of royalty-free licenses, 179 but the current body of research
does not indicate that many scholars have considered the possibility of
compensation through alternatives to monetary royalties, except in the
context of accepting equity in lieu of money for university-based start-up
companies. 180
Commonly, royalty-free licenses are addressed in scholarly literature
within the context of antitrust remedies. 181 If a patent holder behaves
highly anticompetitively, the enforcement agency may evaluate the
situation and determine that the negative effects of this behavior could be
cured by forcing the patent holder to grant royalty-free licenses to anyone
who requests such a license. 182 In practice, however, compulsory licenses
with reasonable royalties are typically viewed as more appropriate as
antitrust remedies than compulsory royalty-free licenses. 183
Scholars who have examined the nonpunitive potential for royalty-free
licenses (as they concern universities) have typically done so in the context
of granting such licenses to universities, often while examining the
possibility of an invigorated experimental use defense in patent law, or
royalties); Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, Standard Non-exclusive License
Agreement 2-3 (n.d.) (unpublished sample agreement), available at http://www.warforg/
uploads/media/20031002132027680_Std non exclusivelicense-agrmt.pdf (providing the
format of the contract segments pertaining to consideration, including license fees and
royalties).
179. See Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 470 (urging the creation of an invigorated
experimental use defense similar to fair use in copyright law in order to protect university
researchers from patent infringement suits). But see Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, What
Copyright Teaches Patent Law About "Fair Use" and Why Universities Are Ignoring the
Lesson, 84 OR. L. REV. 779, 814 (2005) (suggesting that reasonable royalties may be better
for a fair use equivalent in patent law instead of royalty-free licenses); Garde, supra note 6,
at 271-72 (suggesting "licenses of right" for patented research tools instead of royalty-free
licenses); Jensen & Thursby, supra note 62, at 249-50 (presenting a theorem that royalties
increase the effort expended by inventors and thus implying that a royalty-free scenario
would result in less effort by an inventor than if the inventor were receiving royalties).
180. See GAO, TECH TRANSFER, supra note 38; de Larena, supra note 44, at 1416 (noting
that some university TTOs may accept equity in lieu of cash for licensing); Capart &
Sandelin, supra note 61 (describing Stanford's policy of handling industry-sponsored
research results by first offering the sponsor a nonexclusive royalty-free license, with
royalties being required if exclusivity is desired).
181. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 6.5(c) (2003); Barnett, supra note
37, at 1034 (noting that the FTC has recently applied a remedy of compulsory licensing as an
approval condition for some biopharmaceutical mergers); Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory
Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1277; see also
Shamnad Basheer, Block Me Not: How "Essential" Are Patented Genes?, 2005 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL'Y 55, 76 (examining (inconclusively) the possibility of invoking the essential
facilities doctrine as a means of preventing abuse of a dominant position by a patent holder).
182. Lawrence Schlam, Compulsory Royalty Free Licensing as an Antitrust Remedy for
Patent Fraud: Law, Policy and the Patent-Antitrust Interface Revisited, 7 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 467, 470 (1998) (suggesting that compulsory, royalty-free licensing would be an
appropriate remedy where patentees misused patent rights in restraint of trade).
183. See generally Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945)
(amending the district court's order of royalty-free licenses as a remedy to a grant of
compulsory licenses with reasonable royalties).
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suggesting a doctrine similar to the fair use defense in copyright law.' 84
Some critics assert that royalty-free licenses are not consistent with the
goals of patent law or the Bayh-Dole Act, and, thus, that royalty-free
licenses should not be granted to universities. 185 These critics might, for
example, agree with the idea that while the Bayh-Dole Act was not passed
to raise revenue for universities, neither was it passed to help universities
avoid expenses. Some critics of the idea of granting royalty-free licenses to
universities have suggested, as an alternative, compulsory licenses with
reasonable royalties.186
Examining patenting by universities carries with it an examination of
royalties. When a patent is licensed exclusively, the licensee usually will
pay costs that include the cost of patenting.' 87 Royalties typically serve to
compensate the patentee for the cost of development.188 The first question
that becomes apparent is why universities should require royalties at all if
the scientists obtain funds from the government and from industry partners
for the purpose of conducting research. The receipt of royalties by
universities in exchange for patent licenses could be viewed as paying the
universities twice for the same research-once ex ante and once ex post.
Accordingly, it could be argued that it is in fact more consistent with patent
law and the Bayh-Dole Act for universities to grant royalty-free licenses to
the patents of its scientists' inventions.
The literature generally has not addressed royalty-free licenses in the
context of using alternative methods of exchange in place of money
royalties, but an example of such royalty-free licensing can be seen by
184. Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 470; see also Pulsinelli, supra note 39, at 459
(suggesting a compulsory, royalty-free license to universities for patented inventions
produced using government funds); Rose, supra note 174, at 617-18 (suggesting a royalty-
free, fair use-like statute that would be limited to use in scenarios involving a national
emergency or a health crisis, with some circumstances where royalty-based fair use would be
appropriate as well).
185. Garde, supra note 6, at 276 (suggesting that compulsory royalty-free licenses are not
consistent with the goals of patent law).
186. See de Larena, supra note 179, at 814 (suggesting that a fair use equivalent in patent
law would likely work best if it included payment of royalties); Garde, supra note 6, at 279-
81 (proposing that universities should have a "license of right" to use inventions developed
using NIH funds to ensure continued access to patented research tools); Thai, supra note 81,
at 391 (advocating allowing universities compulsory licenses with reach-through royalties
for research tools, where reach-through royalties could be adapted to a university setting by
basing the royalties on licensing revenue); see also Pulsinelli, supra note 39, at 451-53
(suggesting that firms could bundle necessary reagents together into a kit and then sell those
kits with the royalty fees included in the price of the kit, allowing patentees "to recover costs
from researchers without needing to sue or license them individually").
187. See, e.g., The University of Iowa Research Foundation, FAQ,
http://research.uiowa.edu/uirf/pages/universal/faq.html#faq-3 (last visited Mar. 24, 2009)
(noting that when a technology is licensed from a patent held by the University of Iowa, the
licensing agreement may include "an initial licensing fee, reimbursement of patenting costs,
developmental and time-based milestone payments, and royalties based on sales of products
related to the licensed technology").
188. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REv. 1991, 2044 (2007) (stating the importance of ensuring that patent royalties and orders
granting reasonable royalties focus on compensation of patent holders).
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examining start-up companies that grant equity in lieu of paying licensing
fees or royalties. 189  In the context of start-up firms, for example,
commercialization is accomplished by allowing the firm to use the patented
research result and develop a marketable product. However, the start-up
firm may not have the capital available to pay the considerable licensing
fees and royalties, so the university might receive compensation for the
efforts of its researchers through receipt of equity in the start-up firm.' 90
Another possibility that has been touched on briefly is the possible use of
"patent pools" in lieu of charging traditional royalties, where patents would
be pooled together and made available for licensing by subscribers (quite
possibly for lower rates than the licensees would otherwise have paid in the
absence of membership in the pool). 19 1 One recent example of this sort of
activity, though it is not referred to as a patent pool, is the Engineering
Portfolio of Inventions for Commercialization (EPIC) program of the
Stanford OTL. 192
Royalty-free licenses may be viewed as curbing unjust enrichment by
universities, but they also can be viewed as a means by which industry
becomes unjustly enriched. Some critics may be concerned about whether a
royalty-free license granted by a university on a government-funded
invention would effectively constitute a handout from the government.
In fact, a royalty-free license is not a handout because university
technology transfer agreements that involve royalty-free licenses typically
involve cross-licensing, general research funding, or some other form of
mutual exchange. 193 In short, despite some university TTOs' hesitancy to
grant royalty-free licenses, such licenses can be an effective way to bring
necessary resources to the university and to transfer innovation from
universities to industry, and this option should be explored in much greater
frequency in the future.
189. See de Larena, supra note 44, at 1416.
190. See Feldman et al., supra note 156, at 106.
191. See Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and
the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 141,
230-31 (2004) (suggesting the creation of patent pools in the biotechnology sector);
Pulsinelli, supra note 39, at 459 (suggesting that universities should have access to all
government-funded inventions in a scenario that Gary Pulsinelli says would resemble a
patent pool).
192. Industry representatives who subscribe to the Engineering Portfolio of Inventions for
Commercialization (EPIC) program and who wish to license any of the technologies
included in the portfolio can obtain a nonexclusive license for a technology by paying a one-
time fee. Stanford University Office of Technology Licensing, EPIC Summary,
http://stanfordtech.stanford.edu/4DCGI/epicsummary (last visited Mar. 24, 2009); see also J.
Strother Moore, Model Language for Patent and Licensing Agreements for Industrially
Sponsored University Research in Information Technology 5 (June 25, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.(:s.utexas.edu/users/moore/publications/ip-memo-3.pdf
(providing general information concerning the EPIC program and other computer science
and engineering specific concerns about licensing of intellectual property).
193. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1889, 1949 (2002) ("Traditional IP licenses grant the fight to
use the IP in exchange for a royalty payment. But in many industries IP owners regularly
cross-license huge stacks of patents on a royalty free basis.").
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CONCLUSION
The evidence is overwhelming. University tech transfer activities
continue to be predominantly patent-centric and revenue driven with a
single-minded focus on licensing income and reimbursement for legal
expenses. University technology transfer activities do not extend far
beyond this narrow focus and entrepreneurship and commercialization
activities and/or transferring innovation through other means do not figure
prominently. In fact, university TTOs are simply not engaged in a broad
range of activities that might successfully result in the transfer of
university-originated innovation to many different sectors in society.
This essay urges universities to readily embrace alternative technology
transfer methods-such as open collaborations, free participant use
agreements, increased focus on commercialization activities, and royalty-
free licensing-that would result in university innovations being adopted
and disseminated throughout society. In order to embrace this
comprehensive approach to transferring innovation, university TTOs need
to substantively broaden their business models and restructure themselves
within the university hierarchy so that the structural incentives that are
implemented are compatible with a broader vision of technology transfer.
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APPENDIX: FIGURES AND TABLES
This Appendix includes Figures 1-4 and Tables 1-12. Figure 1 shows
the frequency histogram of the Performance Index for all years. Figure 2
illustrates the boxplot of the Performance Index in each year and all years,
while Figure 3 illustrates the same for the top 20 universities. Figure 4
depicts the 20 universities with the largest average Performance Indexes
over eight years.
Table I includes the summary of descriptive statistics of the independent
and dependent variables for all years. Table 2 shows the descriptive
statistics of the Performance Index for each year and all years. Table 9
shows the same for the top 20 universities.
Tables 3-8 and 10-12 include, respectively, linear regression summaries
for the dependant variables "Performance Index"; "Performance Index,"
after removing the top and bottom 5% of performers for each year;
"Licensing Income," in millions; "Running Royalties," in millions;
"Reimbursed Legal Fees," in ten thousands; "Number of Start-Ups"; "U.S.
Patents Issued"; "Total Patent Applications"; and "New Patent
Applications." Tables 3-8 and 10-12 list the independent variables chosen
by the stepwise model selection.
Multiple linear regressions and the stepwise model selection by Mallows'
Cp criterion were performed to build up the best model for the dependent and
independent variables shown in Table I for each year and also for all years.
The Mallows' Cp criterion is often used as a stopping rule for various
forms of stepwise model selection. In multiple linear regressions, when too
many predictor variables whose coefficients must be estimated have been
included in a regression model, it is said to be an "over-fit." The Cp
statistic can be used as a criterion to select a best reduced model to solve
such problems. If P predictor variables are selected from a set of K > P,
then Cp is defined as
RSSpCp - %2 + 2p- N
where RSSp is the residual sum of squares for the model with P predictor
variables; 5_2 is the residual mean square after regression on the complete
set of K predictor variables; N is the sample size; and
N
RSSp (y _ i-i)
2
i=I
in which Yi is the predicted value of the i'th observation of Y from the P
predictor variables. Yi is the observed value of i'th observation of Y.
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Figure 3. Boxplot of the 20 Universities with Top Performance Indexes in
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Figure 4. The 20 Universities with the Largest Average Performance
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Table 1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Dependent
Variables for All Years
Independent and Standard
Dependent N Mean Deviation Min. Median Max.
Variables
Licensing FTE 1343 3 5 0 2 73
(licfte)
OtherFTE 1340 3 6 0 2 82
(othfte) I
Research Expenditures 1331 170 220 0.062 100 2600
(totexp in millions)
Expended Legal Fees
(explgf in ten 1317 84 170 0 35 2200
thousands)
Invention Disclosures 1355 71 97 0 40 1027
(invdis)
Total Patent
Applications 1340 53 82 0 27 884
(tptapp) I I
New Patent
Applications 1339 33 49 0 17 490
(nptapp)
U.S. Patents Issued(upi)1348 19 29 0 10 324(usptis)
AgeofOffice 1266 13 11 0 11 78
(age)
Licensing IncomeLicecsin m 1353 5.8 16 0 0.89 270(lirecd in millions)
Running Royalties 1301 4.3 13 0 0.37 160
(lirunr in millions)
Reimbursed Legal Fees
(reimlg in ten 1294 36 92 0 10 1400
thousands)




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Performance Index for Each Year and
All Years
Year Performance Index





1996 -1.69 -3.37 32.53 -5.47 -4.45 -0.74
1997 -0.86 -3.06 41.07 -5.27 -4.45 0.09
1998 -0.19 -2.44 50.57 -5.46 -4.22 1.00
1999 0.01 -2.21 54.33 -5.44 -4.12 1.39
2000 0.80 -2.45 84.59 -5.30 -4.03 1.54
2001 0.94 -2.08 65.82 -5.24 -3.69 1.91
2002 0.93 -2.49 65.63 -5.43 -4.04 2.41
2003 1.14 -2.08 63.76 -5.51 -3.81 2.52
Note: Q1 is the 25th percentile, and Q3 is the 75th percentile.
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Table 3: Linear Regression Summary of Dependent
Index
Variable Performance
Independent All Years 1996 1997 1998
Variables
* 4.99865 3.18916 5.91571 6.68538
Lice** 0.49141 0.79051 1.04342 0.95224(licfte) *** 0.0001 It 0.0001 It 0.0001 "" 0.0001 ft
2.63798 2.24844 1.91130
othe 0.40927 0.81102 0.92573
(othfte) 0.0001 It 0.0067 tt 0.0416 t
Research -0.60823
Expenditures 0.28874
(totexp in millions) 0.0354 t
Invention Disclosures -2.71059
(invdis) 0.964480.0060 "t
New Patent 1.34231 2.26690 2.78870
Applications 0.30371 0.73994 0.55175
(nptapp) 0.0001 It 0.0028 It 0.0001 It
U.S. Patents Issued 1.59611 1.72167 1.798960.30053 0.47052 0.54643(usptis) 0.0001 It 0.0004 I 0.0014 It
Root MSE 4.92114 2.81581 3.36923 4.20164
Adjusted R-Square 0.6691 0.7258 0.7600 0.6843
Independent 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variables
6.47222 7.92799 6.03781 7.45727 6.04430Iiceni F 1.19898 1.57768 1.61865 1.53049 1.46349
(licfte) 0.0001 tt 0.0001 tt 0.0003 It 0.0001 tt 0.0001 t
O2.22689 4.78146 3.17035 2.62144 2.59629(Othe FE 0.96437 1.20051 1.10849 1.23237 1.05676






New Patent 1.87793 2.27772
Applications 0.55437 0.83039
(nptapp) 0.0010 1" 0.0071 tt
U.S. Patents Issued 1.74784 2.34199
(usptis) 0.77065 0.757710.0252 t 0.0025 11
Root MSE 4.28687 6.57932 5.66428 5.44301 5.20768
Adjusted R-Square 0.6992 0.5914 0.6545 0.6725 0.6965
Note: For the regression fitting, all the independent variables are in log scale.
* is the coefficient of LS estimate; ** is the standard error; *** is the p-value of t-statistics to test
whether the coefficient is zero.
tt is significant at the 0.01 level; t is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 4: Linear Regression Summary of Dependent Variable
Index After Removing Top and Bottom 5% of Performers in
Performance
Each Year
Independent All Years 1996 1997 1998
Variables
* 1.14654 1.23388 1.15922
Licensing FTE ** 0.23086 0.34473 0.49253
(lifte) *0.0001 tt 0.0006 tt 0.0208 " _
1.48909 1.03446 1.63848Othe 0.18425 0.41268 0.43392




Invention Disclosures 0.656 0.26847(ivi) 0.16516 0.26847(invdis) 0.0002 ft 0.0002 tt
0.61482 1.3 1129Total Patent Applications 0.22992 0.53474
(tptapp) 0.0076 ft 0.0159 t
0.64506 1.11667 1.41352 1.21366New Pstent Applications 0.22090 0.27944 0.27668 0.55098
(nptapp) 0.0036 tt 0.0001 it 0.0001 It 0.0299 t
0.83282 0.68223 0.84378U.S. Patents Issued 0.13317 0.24464 0.24038
(usptis) 0.0001 ft 0.0065 tt 0.0007 tf
Age of Office
(age)
Root MSE 2.19775 1.22926 1.49773 1.80665
Adjusted R-Square 0.7598 0.7986 0.7928 0.7668
Independent 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variables
1.74037 2.40254Licensing FTE 0.64663 0.64516
(liefle) 0.0082 "tf 0.0003 ft
1.26940 2.24773 2.29325 1.56898 2.01773Othe 0.47138 0.50305 0.47824 0.53993 0.46163
(othfie) 0.0082 tt 0.0001 t' 0.0001 ft 0.0044 ft 0.0001 tt
0.92970
Research Expenditures 0.42417
(totexp in millions) 0.0304 f
1.19552 1.34554
Invention Disclosures 0.4385 1.56(ivi)0.43805 0.50767(invdis) 0.0074 tt 0.0091 tt
1.84820 2.00735Total Patent Applications 0.39787 0.46950
(tptapp) 0.0001 tt 0.0001 tt
2.26128
New Patent Applications 0.26387
(nptapp) 0.0001
1.13000 1.00227 1.95367USPts 0.44742 0.41417 0.31603
(usptis) 0.0129 t 0.0172 t 0.0001 tt
0.70263Age of Office 0.33966
(age) 0.0409 t
Root MSE 2.04420 2.41998 2.39442 2.52393 2.57622
Adjusted R-Square 0.7624 0.7542 0.7630 0.7389 0.7509
Note: For the regression fitting, all the independent variables are in log scale.
* is the coefficient of LS estimate; ** is the standard error; *** is the p-value oft-statistics to test
whether the coefficient is zero.
tt is significant at the 0.01 level; t is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 5. Linear Regression Summary of Dependent Variable Licensing
Income (in Millions)
Independent All Years 1996 1997 1998
Variables
* 0.61174
Licensing FTE ** 0.14296
(lifte) *** 0.000 1 tt
0.65396 0.39051 0.49067 1.20817Research Expenditures 0.08747 0.19148 0.18337 0.21502
(totexp in millions) 0.0001 tt 0.0440 t 0.0086 tt 0.0001 tt
0.32839 0.47937 0.65037 0.39816Exp end0.05956 0.15746 0.13230 0.15265




New Patent Applications 0.09225(nptapp) 0.0016 t
0.53662 0.523 0.38303
USPts 0.09580 0.23081 0.18052
(usptis) 0.0001 tt 0.0256 t 0.0361 t
0.30406 0.54885
age 0.09067 0.2631 1(age) 0.0008 tt 0.0391 t
Root MSE 1.54984 1.23192 1.21081 1.78524
Adjusted R-Square 0.5564 0.5185 0.6360 0.5386
Independent 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variables
0.95998 1.00870 0.98803Licensing FTE 0.45927 0.33803 0.33229
(licfte) 0.0387 f 0.0035 tt 0.0036 tt
1.17122 0.86388 0.38362Research Expenditures 0.25379 0.23193 0.18562
(totexp in millions) 0.0001 tt 0.0003 tf 0.0410 t
0.53343 0.84011 0.82199
Expene eg Feeuss) 0.09952 0.14776 0.18016
(explgfin ten thousands) 0.0001 t" 0.0001 tt 0.0001 t"
Invention Disclosures 1.61004
(invdis) 0.335110.0001 t
New Patent Applications -0.96368
(nptapp) 0.0032 t
1.04603
U.S. Patents Issued 040(usptis)0.22340(uspis) J0.0001 tt
0.69856 0.50939AgeofOffice 0.31371 0.24187
(age) 0.0278 t 0.0374 t
Root MSE 1.92216 1.60899 1.32045 1.3168 1.6057
Adjusted R-Square 0.4870 0.5704 0.6532 0.5995 0.5648
Note: For the regression fitting, all the independent variables are in log scale.
* is the coefficient of LS estimate; ** is the standard error; * is the p-value oft-statistics to test
whether the coefficient is zero.
tt is significant at the 0.01 level; t is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 6. Linear Regression Summary of Dependent Variable Running
Royalties (in Millions)
Independent All Years 1996 1997 1998
Variables
* 0.77655
Licensing FTE ** 0.23687
(licfte)0.38(licfie) *** 0.00 11 II"
Research Expenditures 0.97708 1.01795 1.44039
(totexp in millions) 0.14309 0.39774 0.231420.0001 "t 0.0119 t 0.0001 tt
Expended Legal Fees 0.22786







0.80850 2.04432 0.86916USPts 0.15717 0.24202 0.37259(usptis) 0.0001 ft 0.0001 tf 0.0216 t
Age f Off 0.51854 1.08821
agoice 0.14860 0.32274(age) 0.0005 tt 0.001 tt
Root MSE 2.52521 2.17041 2.73149 2.26138
Adjusted R-Square 0.3937 0.4082 0.3018 0.4355




Research Expenditures 1.76563 1.69651 1.06196 0.68217ResearcExpndlits 0.30924 0.31179 0.37515 0.24249(totexp in millions) 0.0001 "" 0.0001 f"t 0.0055 "" 0.0058 tt
Expended Legal Fees 0.87719 0.92823
(explgf in ten 0.18413 0.22298
thousands) 0.0001 1 0.0001 t1







Age of Office 1.11881 1.34357age) 0.49147 0.53764(age) 0.0246 t 0.0138 t
Root MSE 3.04003 3.10303 2.77305 1.89148 1.98740
Adjusted R-Square 0.3408 0.3292 0.3618 0.4490 0.5393
Note: For the regression fitting, all the independent variables are in log scale.
* is the coefficient of LS estimate; ** is the standard error; * is the p-value of t-statistics to test
whether the coefficient is zero.
tt is significant at the 0.01 level; f is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 7: Linear Regression Summary of Dependent Variable Reimbursed
Legal Fees (in Ten Thousands)
Independent All Years 1996 1997 1998
Variables
* 0.46441
Other FTE 0.9573(othft* 0. 19573(othfte) *** 0.0179 t
Expended Legal Fees 1.18336 1.96071 1.56971 1.48784
(explgf in ten 0.10149 0.24390 0.32564 0.22834
thousands) 0.0001 tt 0.0001 1 0.0001 tt 0.0001 tt
1.03678
Total Patent 037








(age) 0.0001 tt 0.0028 tt
Root MSE 2.77577 3.02582 3.12917 3.15658
Adjusted R-Square 0.4516 0.3841 0.4734 0.4340
Independent 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variables
Other FTE 1.05319(othfte) 0.33773
0.0023 tt
Expended Legal Fees 0.96474 1.83252 0.96116 1.59385 1.79641
(explgf in ten 0.19307 0.21508 0.16203 0.15656 0.16668







U.S. Patents Issued 0.308(usptis) 0.30893(usptis) 0.0003 tt
Age of Office
(age)
Root MSE 2.79703 2.98526 2.38493 2.26974 2.44715
Adjusted R-Square 0.4556 10.3623 0.4517 0.4652 0.4939
Note: For the regression fitting, all the independent variables are in log scale.
* is the coefficient of LS estimate; ** is the standard error; *** is the p-value oft-statistics to test
whether the coefficient is zero.
tt is significant at the 0.01 level; t is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 8: Linear Regression Summary of Dependent Variable Number of
Start-Ups
Independent All Years 1996 1997 1998
Variables
* -0.1253
Other FTE -0.054(othf* 0.0542(othfle) *** 0.0208 1
Research 0.1440
Expenditures 0.0547
(totexp in millions) 0.0085 ft
Expended Legal Fees -0.2497
(explgf in ten 0.1228
thousands) 0.0421 t
Invention Disclosures 0.6002 0.6090
(invdis) 0.0685 0.1844(invdis) 0.0001 "t 0.0010 It
Total Patent 0.1700 0.7238
Applications 0.0823 0.2617
(tptapp) 0.0390 f 0.0057 It
Age of Office 0.2091 0.3916 0.2688
age 0.0442 0.1484 0.1218(age) 0.0001 t 0.0083 t" 0.0274 1
Deviance Test 1.5445 1.7669 1.4193 1.3621
Goodness of Fit
Independent 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variables 
-0.4711








0.8460 0.8833 0.9761Invention Disclosures 0.1792 0.1964 0.2168




0.3248 0.4662AgeofOffice 0.1302 0.1157
(age) 0.0126 t 0.0001 1"1"
Deviance Test 1.3664 1.5681 1.8170 15113 1.5467
Goodness of Fit
Note: By the Poisson model with log link function, all the independent variables are in log scale.
* is the coefficient of LS estimate; ** is the standard error; *** is the p-value oft-statistics to test
whether the coefficient is zero.
!1 is significant at the 0.01 level; t is significant at the 0.05 level.
The deviance testing goodness of fit is smaller than 2, which suggests that the models are
adequate.
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics of Performance Indexes for Each Year and
All Years for the Top 20 Universities
Year Performance Index
Mean Median Max. Min. QI Q3
AllArs 14.64 10.71 84.59 1.83 7.53 17.37Years
1996 7.19 4.55 32.53 1.83 2.81 8.08
1997 10.47 6.56 41.07 3.10 4.12 13.24
1998 12.35 8.01 50.57 4.43 5.66 13.88
1999 14.12 8.31 54.33 5.53 7.68 16.39
2000 18.32 13.16 84.59 7.65 8.67 20.61
2001 17.62 13.27 65.82 6.92 8.60 22.35
2002 18.53 12.97 65.63 7.54 11.35 21.73
2003 18.50 14.16 63.76 9.15 10.89 21.30
Note: Q1 is the 25th percentile, and Q3 is the 75th percentile.
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Table 10. Linear Regression Summary of Dependent Variable U.S. Patents
Issued




(othfte) * 0.0001 ft 0.0009 t"
Research Expenditures 0.12985 0.15918 0.182620.02673 0.06629 0.06321(totexp in millions) 0.0001 tt 0.0178 t 0.0045 tt
0.26513 0.25613 0.37857Expended Legal Fees 0.02395 0.05414 0.06120
(explgfin ten thousands) 0.0001 tt 0.0001 tt 0.0001 tt
0.14916 0.19105
Invention Disclosures 003333 0.05(ivi) 0.03333 0.08528(invdis) 0.0001 tt 0.0268 t
Total Patent 0.23071 0.56080 0.36307
Applications 0.03316 0.07358 0.07399
(tptapp) 0.0001 tt 0.2522 0.0001 "t 0.0001 't
Applictions0.25262
New Patent Applications 0.08906
(nptapp) 0.0053 It
0.06642
Age of Office 0.02515
(age) 0.0084 tt
Root MSE 0.51380 0.46831 0.62829 0.48224
Adjusted R-Square 0.7782 0.7576 0.6566 0.8120
Independent 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variables
0.19433 0.20447 0.221250.08102 0.07746 0.09058(othfte) 0.0177 1 0.0092 tt 0.0157 t
0.12818 0.27039 0.20860 0.15159
Research Expenditures 0.06204 0.06234 0.06551 0.06901(totexp in millions) 0.0406 t 0.0001 It 0.0018 t 0.0295 1
0.22467 0.31353 0.28159 0.37115 0.36240Expended Legal Fees 005413 0.05781 0.06543 0.06323 0.06252
(explgfin ten thousands) 0.0001 It 0.0001 It 0.0001 It 0,0001 tt 0.0001 t"
0.22480 0.24355Invention Disclosures 0.07710 0.09483(invdis) 0.0041 ft 0.0111 t
Total Patent 0.35377 0.22215 0.26361 0.19766
Applications 0.06707 0.08225 0.07456 0.09164
(tptapp) 0.0001 It 0.0077 1f 0.0005 t _ 0.0325 t
New Patent Applications 0.20492
(nptapp) 0.0037 tt
0.17815 0.15166Age of Office 0.05634 0.06867
(age) 0.0019 It 0.0288 t
Root MSE 0.42389 0.43026 0.45756 0.53213 0.51513
Adjusted R-Square 0.8455 0.8374 0.8106 0.7831 0.8128
Note: For the regression fitting, all the independent variables are in log scale.
* is the coefficient of LS estimate; ** is the standard error; *** is the p-value oft-statistics to test
whether the coefficient is zero.
It is significant at the 0.01 level; I is significant at the 0.05 level.
FORDHAMLA WREVIEW
Table 11. Linear Regression Summary of Dependent Variable Total Patent
Applications




(othfte) *** 0.0196 
Expended Legal 0.14188 0.15463 0.08558
Fees (explgf in ten 0.01432 0.03063 0.03458
thousands) 0.0001 tt 0.0001 tt 0.0146 t
Invention 0.14696 0.13007 0.18986
Disclosures 0.01886 0.04852 0.04537
(invdis) 0.0001 It 0.0083 t 0.0001 It
New Patent 0.66518 0.85127 0.72270 0.70827
Applications 0.01874 0.03990 0.05457 0.05576
(nptapp) 0.0001 t 0.0001 It 0.0001 It 0.0001 I"
0.07208 0.10402 0.14662USPtiss 0.01716 0.03979 0.04360
(usptis) 0.0001 t" 0.01 t 0.001 tt
Age of Office 0.10024
(age) 0.040740.0152 t
Root MSE 0.30852 0.27816 0.29326 0.29276
Adjusted R-Square 0.9291 0.9243 0.9333 0.9348




Expended Legal 0.19497 0.23601 0.23645 0.19011
Fees (explgf in ten 0.03836 0.03850 0.03556 0.03204
thousands) 0.0001 tt 0.0001 t0.0001 it 0.0001 tt
Invention 0.21693 0.24870 0.26925 0.20223 0.16252
Disclosures 0.05356 0.05507 0.05433 0.05302 0.04986
(invdis) 0.0001 tt 0.0001 It 0.0001 "t 0.0002 tt 0.0014 tt
New Patent 0.65915 0.57957 0.52189 0.58816 0.69916
Applications 0.05352 0.05399 0.05574 0.04946 0.04754
(nptapp) 0.0001 It 0.0001 It 0.0001 "t 0.0001 "t 0.0001 tt




Root MSE 0.30314 0.32561 0.32067 0.31304 0.29225
Adjusted R-Square 0.9338 0.9179 0.9186 0.9285 0.9401
Note: For the regression fitting, all the independent variables are in log scale.
* is the coefficient of LS estimate; ** is the standard error; *** is the p-value oft-statistics to test
whether the coefficient is zero.
tt is significant at the 0.01 level; t is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 12: Linear Regression Summary of Dependent Variable New Patent
Applications






Invention * 0.14302 0.13565 0.12796
Disclosures ** 0.01919 0.04555 0.05022
(invdis) *** 0.0001 tt 0.0035 tt 0.0120 t
Total Patent 0.77216 0.79376 0.81226 0.87377
Applications 0.01801 0.04434 0.04870 0.02308
(tptapp) 0.0001 t 0.0001 t 0.0001 1 0.0001 tt
Root MSE 0.33373 0.27910 0.30673 0.31092
Adjusted R-Square 0.9058 0.9152 0.9210 0.9121




(explgf in ten 0.0275 t
thousands)
Invention 0.11840 0.18023 0.19842 0.18203 0.17915
Disclosures 0.05803 0.06406 0.06615 0.06218 0.05401
(invdis) 0.0431 t 0.0056 tt 0.0032 tt 0.0039 tt 0.0011 tt
Total Patent 0.77687 0.73962 0.69603 0.75281 0.82218
Applications 0.0546 0.0619 0.06459 0.05716 0.05590
(tptapp) 0.0001 t? 0.0001 tt 0.0001 tt 0.0001 tt 0.0001 tt
Root MSE 0.32771 0.37154 0.37547 0.36763 0.31692
Adjusted R-Square 0.9090 0.8833 0.8726 0.8926 0.9201
Note: For the regression fitting, all the independent variables are in log scale.
* is the coefficient of LS estimate; ** is the standard error; *** is the p-value oft-statistics to test
whether the coefficient is zero.
t is significant at the 0.01 level; t is significant at the 0.05 level.
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